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Doctrina in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*

Gerald A. Press

Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* has long been considered an important text in the history of rhetoric, because Book 4 has been judged to be the first Christian homiletic, an adaptation of the traditional "pagan" art of rhetoric to Christian purposes.¹ The work might also be considered important in the history of philosophy, or of Western culture generally; for it legitimized and even recommended a partial adoption of the "pagan" arts and sciences and outlined something like an educational curriculum for Christians in opposition to those within the church who considered all intellectual culture spiritually dangerous or unnecessary.² Moreover, it recommended the construction of compendia of relevant information on a variety of subjects—such as those later written by Cassiodorus in the early sixth century and Isidore of Seville in the early seventh—which, perhaps ironically, ensured the survival and transmission of pagan learning into the Christian culture of the Middle Ages.³ Although it has not been the focus of intense scholarly work in the past one hundred years, the *DDC* has been discussed by some few students of religion, philosophy, rhetoric, education, and cultural history. But it would be fair to say that close examination of the structure and argument of the work is still in its early stages.

In two previous papers⁴ I have argued that the subject of the work is, as Augustine himself says, the treatment of scriptures, and that taking this as the subject both permits us to understand the organization and structure of the argument clearly, and shows us that the entire work is essentially a rhetoric, a rhetoric that is old in its principles and organization but new in its methods and aims. Thus it exemplifies the interaction between Christianity and the ancient rhetorical tradition in that, like the ancient sophists and even the representatives of the Second Sophistic, the rhetorical theory and instruction is taken to have a moral content,⁵ although that ancient tradition is explicitly rejected. But if we try to follow the argument of the work closely, the subject seems to change at 1.2.2.

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Although Augustine's title for the work is *De doctrina christiana*,⁶ he tells us in the first paragraph of the *Proem* that he intends to teach certain *praecepta tractandarum scripturarum*, precepts of treating scriptures, and the remainder of the *Proem* deals with potential critics of this enterprise. He begins the first book of the work proper by stating that all treatment of scripture (*tractatio scripturarum*) depends on two things: the way of discovering what is to be understood in the scriptures, and the way of setting forth what has been understood; and he says that he will discuss discovery first and setting forth second (1.1.1). Thus the topic originally announced is reiterated. But in the first sentence of 1.2.2, with no transition or explanation, he says, "All *doctrina* is either of things or of signs, but things are learned by means of signs";⁷ and he adds that he will speak first of things and then of signs. Since this corresponds to the division in topics between Book 1 and Books 2 and 3, are we to suppose that the *doctrina* of the title somehow refers not to the work as a whole, but rather only to the first three books? This is puzzling. But it is still more puzzling that, apart from the title, this is the first occurrence of the word *doctrina* in the *DDC* and before this point the topic was twice stated as *tractatio scripturarum*. Now, apparently, the topic is being changed. This apparent topic switch has been neither noted nor satisfactorily accounted for in the literature on the *DDC*.⁸

What is the connection between *tractatio scripturarum* and *doctrina*? Is the former, as Augustine states, the topic of the work? Or is it *doctrina christiana*, as the title suggests? And what is the relation between the *omnis doctrina* of 1.2.2 and the *doctrina christiana* of the title? In fact, what does *doctrina* mean? To explain the apparent subject change at 1.2.2, the meaning of the word *doctrina* must be understood. These are the questions I address in what follows. I argue that *doctrina* has a range of logically related meanings, of which the most general and inclusive is "learning" as a cultural ideal, and that Augustine, an accomplished rhetorician, deliberately and artfully uses that variety of meanings in order, at once, to refute the pagan ideal and construct a Christian version of it. Ironically, as I suggest in conclusion, the Christian culture he constructed is perhaps even more deeply rhetorical than the classical rhetoric he hoped to convert.

There have been a number of enlightening general discussions of

the *DDC* as an exegetical, homiletic, rhetorical, or educational work; and usually the authors take some position on the meaning of *doctrina*, if only by their translations of the title. On the other hand, a few recent attempts to explain what the *DDC* is about explicitly define the term. In 1959, E. Hill argued, against Marrou's influential view of the *DDC* as a "fundamental charter of a Christian culture," that the work is actually a "manual for use in training the clergy to teach and preach," and that its correct title is *On How to Teach Christianity*.⁹ So for him, *doctrina* means 'teaching', and he thus recurs to the older views of Eggersdorfer, against which Marrou's work had been so powerful.¹⁰ Eugene Kevane reasserted a position similar to Marrou's in a number of articles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, explicitly arguing that when Augustine uses *doctrina* he means what the Greeks meant by *PAIDEIA*, education in the broad sense that constitutes a comprehensive intellectual and moral formation.¹¹ In 1974, L. M. J. Verheijen criticized the vagueness of Kevane's position and argued for a sort of middle ground.¹² Based on his examination of every use of *doctrina* in the *DDC*, but only in that work, he concluded that in fifteen of its twenty occurrences Augustine means either 'doctrine' or 'teaching'; but that five times, all in the plural and all between 2.19.29 and 2.42.63, which he considers a digression from the main line of Augustine's argument, he means 'culture'. For Verheijen, then, the *DDC* contains Marrou's "fundamental charter of a Christian culture," but this is a particular passage that is embedded in a treatise the overall topic of which is something else, namely, hermeneutics. So, in Verheijen's opinion, what Augustine means by *doctrina* is usually 'teaching' or 'doctrine', but a few times he uses it as 'culture.'

As diverse as their views of the meaning of *doctrina* are, however, these scholars share a desire to find a single, simple meaning for the term, and to state simply and univocally what the *DDC* is—a treatise on hermeneutics, or clerical education, or education in general, or a Christian rhetoric. As tidy and convenient as it might be, however, this desire cannot be fulfilled. The meaning of *doctrina* is complex, its role in the *DDC* is complex, and the kind of cultural artifact that the *DDC* is is also complex. This can be seen by briefly considering the range of the word's meanings, how this range of meanings changes in connection with the history of late antiquity, and Augustine's own intellectual training, skills, and habits.

Consider, first, what might be called the “logical semantics” of *doctrina*, that is, just the variety of logically distinguishable meanings that can be found in the attested uses of the word. For the moment I am restricting myself to classical, that is, pre-Christian, Latin; in the next section of the paper I will discuss Christian Latin usage, and I hope this will show how the “meaning” of the term is in part historically conditioned.¹³ *Doctrina* derives from the verb *docere*, to teach; so that in its semantically most basic and also its oldest attested sense it means an instance of the activity of teaching, instructing, educating.¹⁴ Cicero, for example, has Antonius in the *De Oratore* (1.59.252) affirm that we can know enough about the common law *sine doctrina*, without teaching; and in the *Tusculan Disputations* the unidentified “M.” says we feel grief at the death of a loved one “led by nature, not by any reasoning and not by instruction.”¹⁵ This primarily active meaning of *doctrina* is still found in our word, indoctrination.

The second major sense of *doctrina* is a logical development from the first one: the content of the teaching, that which is taught, perhaps, by the arts or sciences. This is ‘doctrine’ in its ordinary English usage today; we might speak of a religious, scientific, or philosophic doctrine, a proposition or set of propositions that are accepted as true in a particular field or by a particular individual, and which are therefore propagated, taught, and learned. Doctrine in this sense, among the ancients, can be either specific—referring to the doctrines of philosophy, rhetoric, astrology, religion, military science, jurisprudence, and the like¹⁶—or general, in which case it sometimes refers to or even translates the Greek term ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA as a content or substance learned. The ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA was the ancient general education that is the ancestor of the medieval liberal arts and, through them, of our contemporary (and often regrettable), breadth, distribution, or “General Education” requirements.¹⁷ Thus Cicero often refers to *liberalis doctrina*¹⁸ and Quintilian speaks of “that cycle of *doctrina* which the Greeks call ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA.”¹⁹

In its third major meaning, *doctrina* refers to literature and the arts themselves; learning or intellectual culture as an objective fact. And just as the second meaning can be seen to grow out of the first, so this third one is a generalization or expansion of the second. It is an easy transition from *doctrina* as the “content” of an art or science to *doctrina* as the art or science itself. We too

sometimes use the words “education” and “learning” in this way when we say that someone “has” or “is getting” an education. Discussing the relative difficulty of oratory and other arts, for example, Ciceo refers to “Athens, the discoverer of all *doctrinae*,”²⁰ Macrobius calls Latin literature *doctrina Latiaris*,²¹ and there is a recurrent phrase, *studium doctrinae* or *studia doctrinarum*, meaning the study of literature or the arts.²²

Finally, there is a fourth meaning of *doctrina* that grows from and includes all the previous ones and represents, not the objective activity or content of teaching, nor the arts and sciences in themselves, but rather their subjective results or effects: education, learning, or knowledge. Thus Varro refers to a certain Atilius of Spain as a man “skilled in the *doctrina* of many things.”²³ But especially, *doctrina* in this sense has to do with education in the liberal arts. Cicero refers to the Greeks as “men rich not only in native talent and *doctrina*, but also in leisure and zeal.”²⁴ Charmadas the Academic is described as “a man ready and rich in all *doctrina*, and in a rather incredible variety and multiplicity of information.”²⁵ Cornelius Nepos complains that Cato’s histories “show a lot of diligence and industry, but no *doctrina*.”²⁶ The term’s emphasis, as should be clear, is on “learning” in the sense of information or skill; nevertheless, in the relaxation of semantic and conceptual boundaries characteristic of late antiquity, it was used as an equivalent of *prudentia* or *sapientia* by Pomponius Prophyrio and in the Vulgate.²⁷ And although *doctrina* in this sense is usually used in the singular, there are, as with other abstract nouns in Latin and Greek, cases of the plural used with a singular meaning.²⁸ Just as the second meaning relates *doctrina* at an objective or content level to the Greek ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA, so *doctrina* in this fourth sense is related to PAIDEIA at a subjective and moral level. The ancients as far back as the legendary Seven Sages of Greece considered learning or knowledge something praiseworthy; *doctrina* is thus one of the words for a cultural ideal. *Doctrina* was not the only or even one of the more important terms in the vocabulary of Latin cultural ideals, except in Cicero,²⁹ but it was one of many. It could be used in the context of divine things or sciences, but this would by no means be its primary use in classical times.

This brief survey of the meanings of *doctrina* suggests two relevant observations: first, the word has a variety of meanings—teaching, doctrine, the arts, and learning—that are not simply

different; they are logically related to each other in an order, as I have arranged them, of increasing generality or inclusiveness. The ideal of learning includes the arts and sciences whose mastery constitutes it; and these include their characteristic doctrines, which, in turn, arise out of teaching. Second, in all of these meanings the term is part of the classical intellectual vocabulary, having been put there by Cicero—it concerns education, learning, the arts and sciences—and in its broadest and most inclusive sense, *doctrina* is a Roman intellectual ideal related to the Greek ideal of *PAIDEIA*. These observations already indicate that the desire to find a single, simple meaning for the word in the *DDC* is hopeless. The various meanings that we distinguish in twentieth-century English or other languages for ancient Greek or Latin words indicate only the distinct words, terms, or meanings in our languages to which, in various instances, the usage of the ancient word best corresponds. From the point of view of the ancients or of Augustine, to use the word *doctrina* was not to communicate some distinct meaning in a modern language; it was to invoke what is, from *our* point of view, a spectrum of logically related meanings. If, for example, the idea of 'doctrine' is uppermost in the mind of a writer in a particular passage—say, a rhetorical or philosophic doctrine—still, the remaining spectrum of *doctrina*'s meanings is subliminally present: the 'doctrine' in question is the content of someone's 'teaching,' it is part of one of the arts or sciences, and to know such 'doctrines' is to be 'learned' or 'erudite,' a commendable thing in a person. And the more educated a person is, the more likely that the full spectrum of meanings will be consciously and deliberately invoked. Verheijen claimed that *doctrina* sometimes means both 'doctrine' and 'teaching' at once; if so, this is not something remarkable or exceptional about Augustine's work.³⁰ On the contrary, it would be remarkable if he restricted himself to the use of *doctrina* in just one of these senses.

In addition to the simply logical differences among a word's meanings, there is a second aspect to be considered; this could be called "historical semantics,"³¹ because it has to do with changes in a term's meanings over time. The variety of a word's meanings, the semantic center of those meanings, and the evaluative connotations that attach to a word often change as a result of philosophical, religious, political, or other sorts of movements in the community of users of the language. This is happening to many terms in

the intellectual vocabulary in late antiquity, including the word *doctrina*. I will only sketch the development here, but three stages may be distinguished, corresponding to the stages in the early history of Christianity as a social movement. The first stage relates to the earliest spread of Christianity out of Judaea and its entry into the Roman political and cultural world. When the Bible was translated into Latin, the Greek words DIDACHE (the activity of teaching) and DIDASKALIA (teaching, instruction, education), which occur many times, were often translated by *doctrina*.³² Occasionally *doctrina* translated the word PAIDEIA and its cognates as well.³³ Recall that in the classical Latin vocabulary *doctrina* had not been particularly a religious term, although it could be used in such contexts. This new translation was, therefore, not incorrect. But because the realities and values of the Judaeo-Christian world differ from those of the Graeco-Roman world, this translation necessarily both extended and added to the old and non-Christian meanings.³⁴ To begin with, these additions and extensions occurred in phrases such as *doctrina dei*, *doctrina Christi*, and *doctrina spiritus sancti*.³⁵ Early Christian writers soon spoke also of the *doctrina* of the apostles, bishops, abbots, or the sacred scriptures themselves.³⁶ In all of these cases the extension of the old meanings 'doctrine' and 'teaching' is perfectly reasonable and understandable. But through this process, a previously ordinary item in the intellectual vocabulary acquired a special status for a certain group of users of the language because the term occurs so often in the New Testament translations, reflecting the importance that Christianity attaches to religious 'teaching'.³⁷

The second stage relates to the spread of Christianity throughout the Latin-speaking world and the struggle between Judaeo-Christianity and Graeco-Roman culture at the social, political, and religious levels. As Christianity came to be a substantial spiritual force in that world, its special extensions of *doctrina* came to compete with and began to supplant the older meanings. In the third and fourth centuries, *doctrina* increasingly occurs in Christian writings, which is to say in religious writings. So its meaning might easily seem to be primarily religious.

The third stage is that of late antiquity, when Christianity had won the social and political struggle and was the official religion of the Empire. Now dominant, Christianity began to build a new intellectual culture by inventing and exploring new words, new ideas, and new forms of intellectual and creative activity, and by

adopting, rejecting, revaluing, or transforming the elements of the Graeco-Roman culture that it sought to replace.³⁸ *Doctrina* as a part of the Latin intellectual vocabulary and as a word for one of the cultural ideals of the Roman world inevitably entered into this process. From the earliest stages, *doctrina* in the Latin of the Christians meant especially the teaching or doctrine of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and so on; and from Cicero's time *doctrina* had been one of the words for a cultural ideal. In late antiquity writers such as Rufinus, Ambrose, Jerome, and, as I shall argue, Augustine use *doctrina* in this sense but with a specifically Christian flavor, learning in Christianity.³⁹ So Augustine is unlikely to have used the word *doctrina* in a single, simple sense in the *DDC*, not only because the word does not have a simple or distinct meaning; more important, the meaning of *doctrina*, like that of many other Latin words at this time, is in process of revision as part of Christianity's conquest and conversion of Graeco-Roman culture.

The essential and inevitable characteristics of the cultural situation, though often ignored, must be kept in mind: first, the transition from a "pagan" to a "Christian" culture did not happen all at once ("with the conversion of Constantine"), but rather was a gradual process, taking centuries and possessing different characters in different areas; second, it was a change brought about not from without, but from within. Its true analogue, taking Greek cultural history as an example, is not the Dorian invasion, but the fifth-century Enlightenment. And, third, the idea of conflict and opposition between two cultures is not so much a fact about the contemporaneous world as it is a characteristic Christian attitude, hearkening back to Paul of Tarsus.⁴⁰ The Christians were not a separate group from the Greeks or Romans in the ancient world, but a subgroup which became dominant. Their defining characteristic—even from their own point of view—was not blood or land, but religion. Consequently, *doctrina* would have a different range of meanings, a different semantic center, and different evaluative connotations depending upon either the literary context in which it was used or the social context within which the hearer or reader lived.⁴¹ To a Latin-speaking non-Christian, *doctrina* would conjure up the traditional arts and sciences along with their doctrinal contents and the intellectual quality of a person grounded in those disciplines and doctrines. But to Latin-speaking Christians of the same time, *doctrina*

would primarily suggest the teachings, doctrines, or dogmas of their religion, and, perhaps, but far less than among the non-Christians, the valued intellectual quality of a person well-grounded in those dogmas.⁴² To Christian and non-Christian alike, therefore, *doctrina* would have a positive or approbative connotation. As I have just shown, however, what is approved by the use of *doctrina* is different in each case. So that while each would respond positively to the use of the word within his own range of meanings, he would respond in a different way to the word within the other's range of meanings. Thus *doctrina* in a non-Christian usage—for example, in Cicero or Quintilian—while the educated Christian would of course understand it, would have a negative connotation precisely because it was a term for “pagan” culture. And an educated non-Christian, on the other hand, would hear or read the Christian use of *doctrina* and be scandalized by its narrowness, particularity, and foreignness.

So far I have argued that *doctrina* had a variety of logically related meanings in classical Latin and that those meanings were being altered in the cultural ferment of late antiquity. A third factor to be considered is Augustine's own intellectual training, abilities, and habits.⁴³ Augustine was born in 354 into a half-Christian family in a part of north Africa that is now Algeria. In his thirties he underwent a spiritual crisis from which he became, successively, a skeptic (in 384), through his reading of Cicero's *Academica*, a (neo-)Platonist (by 386), through his reading of Plotinus and Porphyry in the translations of the rhetorician Marius Victorinus, a baptized Christian (in 387), a priest (in 391), and finally a bishop (in 395). But before this he had received the education of the pagan world, had shown himself a gifted student, and had become a highly successful orator and rhetorician. The art in the use of language and the polemical habit of mind that he acquired from his pagan education and traded upon in his early profession became the hallmarks of his activity as a Christian preacher and writer.⁴⁴

By “artful use of language” and “polemical habit of mind,” which are, in fact, intimately related, I mean only to indicate the intellectual abilities taught by the higher education of late antiquity.⁴⁵ More precisely, “artful use of language” means the trained ability and regular practice and intention of using language, whether spoken or written, to evoke images and arouse feelings in the audience, either for its own sake (as in poetry and

epideictic oratory) or in order to persuade the audience to think or act in a certain predetermined way, by the use of such techniques as word choice, periodic structure, gesture, intonation, and the like. By "polemical habit of mind" I mean the habit of envisaging the situations in which one participates as a writer or speaker as (1) conflicts in which (2) there are exactly two sides (that are opposite or mutually exclusive, just as Yes and No are opposite answers to a question) and understanding that (3) one's own task is to struggle for victory. It is not possible within the limits of a paper to show that these are the likely results of ancient higher education. But a few facts are worth noting: first, that higher education in late antiquity—and not only in late antiquity—was dominated by what Marrou called the literary—rhetorical rather than the mathematical—philosophic model; second, that rhetoric was dominated, both in theory and in educational practice, by the forensic, rather than the epideictic or deliberative model. And the forensic situation really *is* a conflict with two opposite sides—*either* there was *or* there was not a crime: Socrates is *either* guilty *or* not guilty and so on. George Kennedy aptly remarks,⁴⁶ "Not only in Greece and Rome, but in medieval and renaissance Europe, rhetoric was studied at such an early age that, like language itself, it tended to become an instinctive part of students' mental framework and to influence their formal expression in writing." If Augustine is a philosopher—perhaps the philosopher of late antiquity whose influence on subsequent Western thought has been the greatest—he is a philosopher whose mental habits are those of the law court rather than of the Platonic dialogue or the Aristotelian scientific inquiry.⁴⁷

Artful use of language and a polemical habit of thought and writing, moreover, are interesting characteristics in the present case. Given a situation of cultural conflict and approbative terms whose meanings are varied and fluid because they are involved in that conflict, an orator or rhetorician—an artful user of language and able polemicist—can most deliberately and successfully employ the available fluidity of meaning to do battle for his or her own side. An example of this process can be found in the phrase 'right to life' that has recently been used by some anti-abortion groups. Neither those who favor nor those who oppose legalization of abortions believe that it is morally correct to end another person's life; but the issue, at one level, is precisely when it is appropriate to attribute "life" as a person to the baby involved.

The meaning of the word 'life' is fluid; it can mean that of the zygote, that of the baby only upon birth, or something in between. But the word 'life' and the word 'right' both have strongly positive connotations in our society. The anti-abortionists' adoption of the phrase 'right to life' takes advantage of both the fluidity of meaning of 'life' and the positive connotations of 'right' and 'life' to advance their position apart from any actual discussion of the issues. It is a rhetorical *coup*. Similarly, I think that Augustine's use of *doctrina* in the *DDC* is a rhetorical *coup*. He took advantage of the variety of its meanings and the variations in how it would be understood from different cultural standpoints to argue simultaneously for his side and speak to both sides of the dispute between Christianity and "pagan" culture.

The logical and historical semantics of *doctrina* and Augustine's own intellectual predispositions, which have now been considered, provide the background for understanding *doctrina* in the *DDC* other than at 1.2.2. It occurs six times in quotations from the New Testament; and these include the citations from Paul's *Letter to Titus* in which a phrase is found that Augustine himself uses prominently, *doctrina sana*.⁴⁸ Although these uses cannot directly explain Augustine's own use of the word, it is perhaps not without relevance that all of these quotations are in Book 4, the subject of which is how to set forth or teach the truths discovered in scripture—that is, Augustine's "Christian rhetoric"—and that Paul's *Letter to Titus*, which accounts for four of the six citations, is a reminder to Titus of not only what needs to be taught to his Cretan flock, but also how it is to be taught. In Augustine's own words *doctrina* occurs thirteen times in addition to the title and 1.2.2. Four of these are ordinary uses in a Christian work and reveal a clear meaning—either 'teaching' or 'doctrine' taught.⁴⁹

The remaining eight occurrences of *doctrina* do not fit comfortably into just one of the old categories; in each case the meaning of the word in its context is complex, and all of them but one seem to be parts of a general theory about Christian and pagan *doctrinae* and the relation between them. Five passages, in Book 2, concern pagan doctrine. At 2.19.29 Augustine writes, "There are two kinds of *doctrinae* that are practiced in the pagan value system. One is of those things that human beings have instituted; the other is of those things that they have noticed already done or established by divine influence."⁵⁰ Next, he warns of the supersti-

tion involved in certain pagan arts: "So in all those *doctrinae* of theirs the society of demons is to be feared and avoided."⁵¹ Concluding his treatment of the pagan arts and sciences, he observes "that it would be wholesome to instruct eager and talented young men, who fear God and strive for a happy life, that no *doctrinae* that are practiced outside of the church of Christ should they rashly dare to pursue with a view to attaining a happy life. . . ."⁵² A little later in the same paragraph he reiterates his general position: we are not to study either the errors or the unnecessary and excessive things that human beings have created, but we should study the human institutions that are valuable for social purposes. "Among the other *doctrinae* found among the pagans, however, I consider nothing to be useful except the history of things either of past time or of the present pertaining to the bodily senses, to which the proofs and conjectures of the useful mechanical arts are added, and also the science of argument and of number."⁵³ Finally, he sums up his attitude to the pagan doctrine with the well-known "spoils of the Egyptians" argument that is crucial for understanding subsequent Christian intellectual culture. Just as God ordered the people of Israel to flee the evils and idols of Egypt but to take gold, silver, and clothing with them so that they could survive on their journey, "so all the *doctrinae* of the gentiles contain counterfeit and superstitious fictions and heavy burdens of superfluous labor . . . but they also contain liberal disciplines more appropriate to the service of the truth. . . ."⁵⁴

In each of these passages *doctrinae* can be understood as the contents or doctrines of pagan arts and sciences, or, more likely, as the pagan arts and sciences themselves. But, taking the plural as singular in meaning, *doctrinae* can also be understood in every case to refer to the pagan cultural ideal, comprehending the pagan arts and sciences with their particular contents.⁵⁵ In the first passage, for example, Augustine might be distinguishing two kinds of doctrines' contents, as the natural sciences are sometimes distinguished from the human sciences in our century by difference in kind of contents. Thus, too, Augustine might be distinguishing the arts or sciences in themselves as being of different kinds. This interpretation seems improbable, because as the rest of the passage makes clear, Augustine is not concerned with the nature or structure of a discipline, but with what it teaches or of what use this is to a person. And for this very reason it would

make sense—and, I believe, better sense—to take *doctrina* as learning or knowledge, the cultural ideal, the subjective effect or result of teachings, doctrines, or disciplines in a person. Thus Augustine would be distinguishing between two kinds of learning or education, one in things humanly instituted, the other in things divinely instituted.

Similarly, the fifth passage cited above might mean that “all the doctrines of the gentiles” contain fictions; but this seems unlikely since he goes on to say that they also contain “liberal disciplines, *liberales disciplinas*” and a doctrine is not the sort of thing that “contains” a discipline, but rather the reverse. The passage might mean, then, that the “literature or arts of the gentiles” contain fictions, but also liberal disciplines; and if *disciplinas* is taken literally as ‘instruction’ this would make sense. Again, however, I think it makes better sense to take *doctrina* as ‘learning’ or ‘education’; so that Augustine would be saying that “all the learning of the gentiles,” their cultural idea, contains fictions, but also liberal disciplines.

And Augustine has a position about this ideal and about the arts and sciences in which it consists: pagan doctrine has two species, but it is largely superstitious and it is not the way to beatitude, to human happiness; on the other hand, some parts of it are useful for a Christian and in general Christians should reject the bad parts but appropriate the good.

By contrast with the uselessness and empty superstition of pagan *doctrina*, Christian doctrine, in all three of its occurrences, is described in terms of its “soundness.” Augustine observes, a propos a passage from Cyprian, “how the soundness of Christian doctrine has kept his style” from redundancy and given it a dignified and moderate eloquence.⁵⁶ Similarly, he speaks of the “as it were higher position of the ecclesiastical seat, which sound doctrine has established.”⁵⁷ And, finally, he concludes the entire *DDC* saying that he has described in it not himself, “but the kind of person one should be who strives to labor in sound doctrine, that is to say in Christian doctrine, not only for himself, but also for others.”⁵⁸ As in the passages pertaining to pagan doctrine, here too it seems that Augustine trades on the variety of *doctrina*’s meanings. In each of these passages *doctrina* means in part either the ‘teaching’ or the ‘content’ of Christianity, but it also clearly declares that teaching and content to be the right kind as against pagan doctrine. *Doctrina christiana* is opposed to

the *doctrinae gentilium*, is superior to it, and its superiority is expressed as its sanity, its spiritual soundness.

Augustine's uses of *doctrina* in the *DDC*, then, suggest that he has an overall theory or view about *doctrina* that underlies the work although it is not the main point. Consistent with the rhetorical habits of Christian apologetics generally and the habits of his own always polemical writings, Augustine seems to envision a pair of opposites, of mutually exclusive alternatives: *doctrina christiana* and *doctrinae gentilium*.⁵⁹ At the narrower levels of *doctrina*'s meaning they merely differ: the teaching and the doctrines of the gentiles differ from those of the Christians. But the opposition Augustine envisions here, as always, operates at the higher levels as well and more significantly: Christianity is spiritually sound and it leads to true happiness; pagan culture is spiritually sick and it leads nowhere. So, as I see it, the fundamental meaning of *doctrina* in the *DDC* is the most general one among those mentioned earlier—the cultural ideal of 'learning', 'erudition', or 'knowledge'—but, importantly, it is this ideal understood as including the narrower meanings. To use again a phrase I used just above, Augustine trades on the range of meanings.

If this is true, then the statement at 1.2.2 with which this paper began is the beginning of a general discussion of *doctrina* as a cultural ideal, a discussion that lies under the surface throughout the *DDC*. He begins by making a general statement about *doctrina* so understood. "All learning, erudition, knowledge is a matter either of realities or of signs." In the first place, this means *all* learning, whether pagan or Christian; but, in the second place, it says of this learning that there are exactly two types of it. I am not sure whether this is an original idea or not, but I know of no earlier attempt to state a general division of all *doctrina*. He continues: "But realities are learned by means of signs." So there is a proper relationship between the two types of learning: a proper *doctrina* would be a learning of realities and it would involve a learning of signs as means to the learning of realities. So two criteria are already implicitly established about *doctrina* as a cultural ideal: it must be of realities, not fictions or empty images or merely of the signs of those realities; and it must be a learning of signs only as a means to the learning of realities. The grounds on which the critique of the traditional pagan *doctrina* will be built can already be seen: in the first place it is of unrealities, fictions (for example, their gods and myths); and in the

second place much of it is just learning about signs, in nature and in the arts of language.⁶⁰

At any rate, after stating what *doctrina* is in general and establishing the criteria of a proper *doctrina*, he begins his account of the Christian version of this ancient cultural ideal. First he states the realities of which it is the knowledge (Book 1), the theological and moral dogmas of Christianity. Then he proceeds to discuss the signs by means of which these realities are to be known; that is, the language of the Bible insofar as it may impede the learning of the realities (Books 2–3). And in the course of this he is led to discuss the pagan ideal of *doctrina*.

The first thing he says is that in the pagan value system (*mores*) two kinds of *doctrinae*, two kinds of learning are practiced. Again, here, Augustine makes a general statement about *doctrina* as a cultural ideal, this time about the pagan *doctrina*. One of the two kinds is of things that humans have instituted. Most of the species of this genus of pagan learning are superstitious (e.g., astrology, painting, and sculpture); but some are useful and necessary for the conduct of social life (e.g., weights and measures, coinage, and writing) and knowledge of these is recommended to a Christian. The other genus of pagan doctrine is of things that human beings have not instituted but have investigated; these are useful for understanding the Bible. And they are nothing less than the entire constellation of pagan disciplines, the ENKGUK-LIOS PAIDEIA, but only insofar as they can help explain difficult passages in scripture: history, natural history, astronomy, mechanical arts, logic, dialectic, rhetoric, mathematics, and even philosophy, which leads Augustine to the “spoils of the Egyptians” argument. So pagan doctrine as an ideal, and several of its parts, particular arts and practices, are rejected; but Augustine has taken over much of the content of this ideal for the Christian *doctrina* that he is expounding, although he has not called it that so far, other than in the title of the work.

Finally, in Book 4, he deals in greater detail with one part of the pagan doctrine that has special importance for his new ideal of Christian *doctrina*, rhetoric, although this rhetoric of Book 4 is untraditionally narrow.⁶¹ It is especially important because the realities that are the core of Christian learning are pre-eminently taught by preaching. And here for the first time in the text of the work he actually uses the phrase, Christian doctrine.

So, on the hypothesis that *doctrina* at 1.2.2 means the cultural

ideal of learning or knowledge, the *DDC* as a whole turns out to be in one sense a polemic against the non-Christian ideal of *doctrina* and at the same time the exposition of a true, proper, sound vision of that ideal, a Christian vision of it, which retains the name and much of the form of the old ideal. At this point I have answered most of the questions I raised at the outset of this paper. I have argued that the meanings of *doctrina* are several and that understanding what Augustine meant by the term is complicated both by a logical relationship of increasing inclusiveness or generality among the different meanings and by a historical process of redefinition of the word that was going on under the growing impact of Christianity on the traditional Latin intellectual vocabulary. Given these complexities, I have argued that the primary meaning of *doctrina* in the work is its most general one, so that the *omnis doctrina* of 1.2.2 includes the *doctrina christiana* of the title—learning as a cultural ideal—and that underlying the work as a whole is a critique of the pagan ideal and presentation of a Christian alternative to it.

The two most puzzling questions, however, are still to be answered: What is the connection between *tractatio scripturarum* and *doctrina*? And, which one of them is the real topic of the work? As I mentioned earlier, I have elsewhere argued that the *DDC* is about *tractatio scripturarum*, the treatment of scriptures. And this treatment, Augustine says, consists in two things: discovering the meaning of the text and expounding that meaning. Now *tractatio* is a traditional term in the vocabulary of classical rhetoric and could easily be applied to interpretation and exposition of documents, although this was not an emphasis of Greek or Roman rhetoricians. This is, however, an especially appropriate subject for a Christian's attention, for two reasons. In the first place, Christianity is, like Judaism and Islam, a distinctively verbal religion; its doctrinal and ritual center is the Word of God, and it is a religion based on a book.⁶² To be a Christian, therefore, involves understanding what is in the book. In the second place, Christianity is an evangelical religion; it brings the good news that the messiah has come, and does so for all peoples. To be a Christian, therefore, is to spread the good news, and this is to teach what is in the book. So the two sides of *tractatio scripturarum* meet essential needs, not only of Christian teachers in a special sense—bishops, priests, or monks—but of all Christians.⁶³

But at the same time the *DDC* provides an answer both to those who asserted and to those who feared that to be a Christian required avoidance of pagan learning or of all learning. A Christian, Augustine argues, does need to learn something—the content of his sacred literature, the doctrines of Christianity, and how to communicate them. What a Christian needs to learn and the learning or knowledge that would be a cultural ideal for a Christian—that is to say, a Christian *doctrina*—is, therefore, learning how to discover what is to be understood and how to set forth what has been understood, which is exactly what *tractatio scripturarum* teaches. *Doctrina christiana*, in sum, is *tractatio scripturarum*. Christian learning or culture is the treatment of scriptures; knowing how to understand or interpret Christian theological and moral truths in the scriptures and knowing how to teach them to others. Thus Christian *doctrina* is similar in name and to some extent in contents and forms to the *doctrinae* of the gentiles. But it differs from and is superior to the latter in three respects. First, in its unity; as there is one God, though God be three persons, and as there is one church, though there be many congregations, so there is one Bible, one book on which one's intellectual efforts focus, rather than the many distinct arts and sciences and books of the gentiles that add up to no single thing—and one teaching, Christianity, rather than the many religious cults and philosophic doctrines of the gentiles that agree on nothing and continually contradict each other. Second, it differs in its morality; the Christian *doctrina* is organized around books and stories and doctrines that inculcate right behavior towards oneself, one's fellows, and God, rather than on the *doctrinae* of the gentiles, which is indifferent to the vanity or superstition of the stories in its books and the unacceptable or scandalous behavior models of its heroes and gods. Third, and most important, Christian *doctrina* leads to true happiness (*beatitudo*), for the truths contained in scripture are saving truths; and this is unlike the *doctrinae* of the gentiles which lead nowhere, have no spiritual direction. And in this third difference between Christian and “pagan” doctrine Augustine achieves a conjunction that is absolutely crucial for the subsequent Western tradition: he relates to Christian vision of an original fall away from God and earthly life as a journey “home” to God, to intellectual culture. Augustine agrees with the anti-culture wing of the early church that the learning of the gentiles is dangerous; but, for him, there is a

Christian learning that is not dangerous and is not merely permissible, it is one of the creature's paths back to its Creator. Learning becomes a form of piety.

Let me conclude with a remark about the significance of this interpretation for the history of rhetoric and for the relation between rhetoric and the history of Western culture. The *DDC* was a formative work for medieval culture,⁶⁴ and through it, for modern Western culture not only because, as Marrou claimed, it adumbrated a Christian culture, but also because it justified the pursuit of such a culture. But the work as a whole is a rhetoric: it is an account of *tractatio*, which derives from the ancient rhetorical tradition, and it is the presentation of a Christian *doctrina*, a renovation of the Graeco-Roman culture which was itself essentially rhetorical.⁶⁵ The Christian culture of which Augustine is rightly considered the founder is, therefore, at its heart a rhetorical culture no less than the pagan culture that it replaced—and perhaps more so. For ideas, such as the idea of history as goal-directed,⁶⁶ and habits of mind, such as the mutually exclusive opposition between that which is “pagan” and that which is Christian—ideas and habits that were formed in the rhetoric of early Christianity—became deep structures of Christian philosophy and theology and remain so to this day.⁶⁷

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Notes

1. For example, C. S. Baldwin, “St. Augustine and the Rhetoric of Cicero,” *Proc. of the Classical Assn.* (London) 22 (1925), 24–26; Ernest L. Fortin, “Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric,” *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974), 85–100; François Jansen, “Saint-Augustin et la rhétorique,” *Nouvelle revue théologique* 57 (1930), 282–97; N. Jubany, “San Augustin y la formación oratoria christiana. Estudio comparado del libro IV *De doctrina christiana* y del *De catechizandis rudibus*,” *Analecta sacra Tarraconensis* 15 (1942), 9–22; Christine Mohrmann, “St. Augustine and the *Eloquentia*,” *Études sur le Latin des Chrétiens* (Rome, 1961), Vol. 1, pp. 351–70; James J. Murphy, “St. Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 46 (1960), 400–10; and Jose Oroz, “La retórica augustiniana. Clasicismo y christianismo,” *Studia Patristica* VI, 485–95. Henceforth *De doctrina christiana* will be cited as *DDC*. Unless otherwise noted, the translations are my own.

2. On the anti-intellectual current in the early church, see Murphy, (n. 1 above), P. Brunner, “Charismatische und methodische Schriftauslegung nach Augustin's Prolog zu *DDC*,” *Kerygma und Dogma* 11 (1955), 59–69, 85–103, and Eugene Kevane, “Paideia and Anti-paideia: The *Proemium* of St. Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*,” *Augustinian Studies* 1 (1970), 153–80.

3. For example, Etienne Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (3d

ed. Paris: Vrin, 1949), 161, n. 2. Ilona Opelt ("Materialen zur Nachwirkung von Augustins Schrift *De doctrina christiana*," *Jb für Antike und Christentum* 17 [1974], 64–73) finds the DDC's influence from Eugippius, Cassiodorus, Isidore, and Bede to Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and Roger Bacon.

4. "The Subject and Structure of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*," *Augustinian Studies* 11 (1980), 99–124 and "The Content and Argument of Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*," *Augustiniana* 31 (1981), 165–82.

5. As with Protagoras in Plato's dialogue, Isocrates, Cicero, and Dio of Prusa, rhetorical instruction is supposed to improve the student, and a true orator is supposed to benefit his hearers. Cf. 2.39.58 and G. Istace, "Le livre Ier du *De doctrina christiana* de s. Augustin," *Ephémérides Théologiques Lovanienses* 32 (1956), 289–330.

6. c. *Faustum* 22.41 (*PL* 42, 461).

7. *Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum, sed res per signa discuntur*. It should be noted that the functions of signs and things had already been discussed in *De magistro*, and Augustine had argued that for humans both discovery and teaching are possible only through signs.

8. Ilona Opelt ("*Doctrina und doctrina christiana*," *Altsprachliche Unterricht* 9 [1966], 5–11) does not take *tractatio scripturarum* seriously as a topic; it is just the *enge Themastellung*. And the shift at 1.2.2 is thus "eine weitere, noch allgemeinere Definition . . . den Gegenstand" (9).

9. E. Hill, "*De doctrina christiana*: A Suggestion," *Studia Patristica* 4, 445.

10. F. X. Eggersdorfer, *Der heilige Augustinus als Pädagoge und seine Bedeutung für die Geschichte des Bildung* (Freiburg: Herder, 1907). On the fundamental conflict between the interpretations of Eggersdorfer and Marrou, see Eugene Kevane, "Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*: A Treatise on Christian Education," *Recherches Augustiniennes* 4 (1966), 97–133.

11. In addition to the articles already cited, see his "Augustine and Isocrates," *American Ecclesiastic Review* 149 (1963), 301–21 and "*Translatio imperii*. Augustine's *De doctrina christiana* and the classical *paideia*," *Studia Patristica* 14 446–60. I have criticized his position in my "Subject and Structure," 103ff.

12. L. M. J. Verheijen, "Le *De doctrina christiana* de saint Augustin," *Augustiniana* 24 (1974), 10–20.

13. The basic source for understanding the semantics and, in principle, the semantic history of Latin words is the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1900–). Alain Hus (*Docere et les mots de la famille de docere* [Paris: Presses universitaires, 1965]) has written an extremely thorough and careful treatment of *doctrina* (pp. 277–332), but in the non-Christian sources only. Marrou ("*Doctrina et disciplina dans la langue des pères de l'église*," *Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi* 9 [1934], 5–25) briefly indicates the variety of each term's meanings and the changes that occurred under the impact of Christianity.

14. The oldest attested uses are: Plautus *Mo* 155 and Lucil. 834 (ed. Marx). For brevity, I am using the standard abbreviations of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1970).

15. *Tusc.* 1.13.30: *natura duce, nulla ratione nullaque doctrina*. In the same sense, e.g., Varro *Ling. Lat.* 10.51, Lucr. 3.307, Pliny *HN* 7.1.4, Quint. *Inst.* 6.5.11, 12.6.4, Apul. *Met.* 9.35.

16. Philosophy: Cic. *Mur.* 29.60, Lucr. 2.8, Val. Max. 3.3.ext. 1. Rhetoric: Cic. *De Or.* 2.19.77, Quint. *Inst.* 2.17.8. Astrology: Lucr. 5.727, Amm. Marc. 20.3.11. Religion: Cic. *Div.* 2.33.70, Amm. Marc. 21.1.7. Military science: Veg. *Mil.* 1.8, Amm. Marc. 24.3.7. Jurisprudence: Dig. 2.7, 2.11 (*Corpus Iuris Civilis* Vol. I, pp. 11, 12).

17. On the ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA, see Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity*, Pt. 2, Chs. 1 and 8. L. M. de Rijk ("Enkuklios paideia. A Study of its Original Meaning," *Vivarium* 3 [1965], 24–93) rejects Marrou's view that this is a "general" education. Marrou defends his position in "Les arts libéraux dans l'Antiquité classique," *Actes du 4^e Congrès internationale de philosophie médiévale* (Montreal–Paris, 1969), 5–27; reprinted in, *Patristique et Humanisme*, pp. 37–63.

For a brief sketch of the ENKGUKLIOS PAIDEIA from antiquity to modern times, see H. J. Mette's article in *Gymnasium* 67 (1960), 300–307.

18. E.g., Cic. *Ac.* 2.1.1, *Fin.* 5.3.7, *Tusc.* 2.11.27.
19. Quint. *Inst.* 1.10.1. See also Cic. *De Or.* 3.127, Vitruv. 6.praef. 4, Nep. *Att.* 1.2, Tac. *Ann.* 13.3.
20. Cic. *De Or.* 1.4.13. For similar assessments of Athens' role in the history of *doctrina*: Cic. *Flacc.* 26.62, *Bru.* 97.332, Val. Max. 4.3.6.
21. Macr. *Sat.* 1.2.7.
22. E.g., Cic. *Tusc.* 4.3.5, *Rosc.* 16.46, *Off.* 1.44.156, Val. Max. 2.2.2, Gell. 13.5.2.
23. Varro *Rust.* 2.4.11.
24. Cic. *De Or.* 1.6.22. Native intelligence (*ingenium*) is regularly contrasted with acquired learning or culture: Cic. *De Or.* 3.4.16, *Bru.* 56.205, Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.9, Sen. *Dial.* 11.12.2, Colum. 3.3.3. Augustine himself (*CD* 19.17) contrasts them as gifts of God.
25. Cic. *De Or.* 1.19.85.
26. Nep. *Cato* 3.4.
27. Porphy. *Hor. Ep.* 2.1.55. Vulgate: *Job* 12.20, *Prov.* 12:8, 13:5, 21:16, 23:9, *Eccles.* 1:17.
28. E.g., Cic. *Or.* 146, Vitruv. 6.2.4, 10.praef. 2, Gell. 13.5.3, Amm. Marc. 27.3.3. In both Greek and Latin plurals of abstract nouns are used in a singular sense to indicate a class.
29. Hus (*Docere* . . . , pp. 308–10) concludes that Cicero virtually created *doctrina* as an ideal; but no subsequent Latin writer made it as central as Cicero had.
30. Verheijen, n. 12 above.
31. On the nature and function of historical semantics, see Richard P. McKeon's *Freedom and History* (New York: Noonday Press, 1952), p. 10 and *Thought, Action, and Passion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 175, 205–12.
32. DIDACHE is translated by *doctrina* in both the Itala (I.) and the Vulgate (V.) of *Mt* 7:28, 16:12, 22:33, *Mk* 1:22, 27, 4:2, 11:18, 12:38, *Lk* 4:32, *Jn* 7:16, 18:19, *Acts* 2:42, 5:28, 13:12, 17:19. DIDASKALIA is translated by *doctrina* in both I. and V. of *Mt* 15:9, *Mk* 7:7, *Rom.* 12:7, 15:4, *Eph.* 4:14, *Col* 2:22.
33. E.g., in the I. of *Is.* 53.5 and V. of *Sirach* 4:29, 6:23, etc.
34. Marrou ("*Doctrina et disciplina*" p. 12) noted how old words acquire new meanings when they are applied "to the things of the Christian religion."
35. *Doctrina dei*: V. *Deut.* 33:3. *Doctrina Christi*: I. and V. *Mt* 7:28, 22:33, *Mk* 1:22, 4:2, 11:18, *Lk* 4:32. *Doctrina spiritus sancti*: I. *I Cor.* 2:13.
36. E.g., the *doctrina* of the apostles: I. *I Cor.* 14:6, Tert. *Praescr.* 44 (*PL* 2, 59A), *Resurr.* 53 (*PL* 2, 874A); of bishops: I. *I Tim.* 4:13, 16, *II Tim.* 4:2, Ambr. *Ep.* 4.7, 23.22; of abbots: Ben. *Reg.* 2 (*PL* 66, 263A, B, 264A).
37. The fact most suggestive of the importance *doctrina* was to have in Latin Christianity is that it occurs 112 times in the Vulgate. No classical author, except Cicero, uses the word more than a few dozen times, most only a few times. By contrast, in Augustine's *City of God* alone it is used 75 times. Similarly disproportional usage may be established in other works of Augustine and in other early Christian writers.
38. Christianity did not, as is still often assumed, simply replace Graeco-Roman culture. It is more accurate to speak, as did F. J. Dölger, of an "interaction" between "Antiquity and Christianity." On Dölger's enterprise and its current status, see Edwin A. Judge, " 'Antike und Christentum'." Some Recent Work from Cologne," *Prudentia* 5 (1973), 1–13 and, more thoroughly, " 'Antike und Christentum': Towards a Definition of the Field," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1979), 2. 23:1, pp. 2–58.
39. Perhaps hearkening back to V. *Prov.* 1:7—*sapientiam atque doctrinam stulti despiciunt*—or, similarly, 8:10 or 15:14. E.g., Rufin. *Orig. in exod.* 9.4, Ambr. *In ps. 118 Serm.* 1.1 (*PL* 15, 1263B), Jerome *In Os.* 1.3 (*PL* 25, 844C–D).

40. On cultural conflict as a characteristically Christian stance, see Edwin A. Judge, "St. Paul and Classical Society," *Jb. für Antike und Christentum* 15 (1972), 30.

41. Similarly, on the meaning of *tempora christiana*, Goulven Madec argues that, as against Marrou, Mandouze, and Markus, the term has four meanings that differ between social groups and reflect different political or social commitments (" 'Tempora Christiana.' Expression du triomphalisme chrétien ou récrimination païenne?" in *Scientia Augustiniana*, ed. Cornelius P. Mayer and Willigis Eckermann [Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag] = *Cassiciacum* 30 (1975), 112–36).

42. To establish this point securely would require a study of *doctrina* and its cognates in early Christianity similar to Hus's study, already cited, of the non-Christian authors. There was a persistent stream of anti-intellectualism in early Christianity (see n. 2 above), to which, in part, the *DDC* is an answer, though this was one of several attitudes.

43. For the basic background, see Eugène Portalie, *A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine*, trans. Ralph J. Bastain (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), pp. 5–36. Peter Brown's *Augustine of Hippo* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) is a careful and imaginative evocation of Augustine's world, his life, and the development of his thought.

44. On his success as a rhetorician, see Brown, *Augustine*, ch. 7. As a Christian he gained fame by his successful debates against leaders of the Manichaeans and Donatists; he wrote works, either by title or by subtitle, against the pagans in general, the Manichaeans, Academics, Donatists, Arians, Valentinians, and Pelagians, often attacking the position of a particular individual. Mandouze ("St. Augustin ou le rhéteur canonisé," *Bull. de l'Assn Budé* 14 [1955], 37–41) argues that *all* of his works are rhetorical and Brown (*Augustine*, p. 354) refers to his "genius as a polemist."

45. On the educational system and ideals, see Marrou, *History of Education in Antiquity*, trans. George Lamb (New York: Mentor, 1964), Pt. 3. On Augustine's own education, see Brown, *Augustine*, pp. 35–39.

46. George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 111.

47. A similar interpretation has been made of Tertullian by Robert Dick Sider ("Structure and Design in the 'De resurrectione mortuorum' of Tertullian," *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 [1969], 177–96, *Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1971], and "Tertullian, On the Shows: An Analysis," *J. of Theological Studies* n.s. 29 [1978], 339–65) and of Gregory of Nazianzus by Rosemary Radford Ruether (*Gregory of Nazianzus. Rhetor and Philosopher* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1969]).

48. *Doctrina sana* at 4.16.33 may be part of the quotation of Titus 1:9, as Vogels makes it (*Flor. Patr.* Vol. 24, 86, l. 27); but Green (*CSEL* 80, 142, l. 12) makes it Augustine's own words. The undisputed quotations are: *doctrina* at 4.20.40 quoting *Rom.* 12:6–7 and 4.30.63 quoting *1 Tim.* 5:17; *doctrina sana* at 4.16.33 (Green p. 142, line 13) quoting Titus 1:9, 4.16.33 (Green 142, 15) quoting Titus 2:1, and 4.28.61 quoting Titus 1:9 again.

49. At 1.16.15 he speaks of the *apostolica doctrina*; at 2.16.25 of the *doctrina* of condemning temporal things and desiring eternal ones; at 4.7.21 *doctrina* refers to the content of the *ars oratoria*; and at 4.16.33 he refers to the 'benefits of teaching'.

50. 2.19.29: *duo sunt genera doctrinarum quae in gentilibus etiam moribus exercentur. unum earum rerum quas instituerunt homines, alterum earum quas animadverterunt iam peractus aut divinitus institutas.*

51. 2.23.36: *in omnibus ergo istis doctrinis societas daemonum formidanda atque vitanda est.*

52. 2.39.58: *quam ob rem videtur mihi studiosis et ingeniosis adolescentibus et timentibus deum beatamque vitam quaerentibus salubriter praecipi ut nullas doctrinas quae praeter ecclesiam Christi exercentur tamquam ad beatam vitam capessendam secure sequi audeant, sed eas sobrie diligenterque diiudicent.*

53. 2.39.58: *in ceteris autem doctrinis quae apud gentes inveniuntur, praeter historiam rerum vel praeteriti temporis vel praesentis ad sensus corporis pertinentium, quibus etiam utilium artium corporalium experimenta et coniecturae annumerantur, et praeter rationem disputationis et numeri nihil utile esse arbitror.*

54. 2.40.60: *sic doctrinae omnes gentilium non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta gravesque sarcinas supervacanei laboris habent . . . sed etiam liberales disciplinae usui veritatis aptiores.*

55. Thus I think that Opelt ("*Doctrina und doctrina christiana*") is mistaken in concluding that there are two different *Bildungsbegriffs* corresponding to the two stages of the *DDC*'s composition. She has taken these stages so seriously that she fails to see the overall integration of the work as we have it.

56. 4.14.31: *quam linguam doctrine Christianae sanitas ad ista redundantia revocaverit.*

57. 4.27.59: *scilicet superiore sedis ecclesiasticae quam sana doctrina constituit.*

58. 4.31.64: *sed qualis esse debeat qui in doctrina sana, id est Christiana, non solum sibi sed aliis etiam laborare studet. . . .*

59. The opposition between 'us' and 'you', between 'christians' and 'pagans' or 'gentiles' is the basic rhetorical motif of the apologies of Aristides, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Tertullian, as well as Clement of Alexandria's *Exhortation to the Heathen* and the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, to name a few. The opposition between a heavenly and an earthly city and between the *sacra* (or *divina*) *historia* of the former and the *historia gentium* of the latter is the dominant rhetorical motif of the greatest and most influential of the early Christian apologies, Augustine's *City of God*. See my *The Development of the Idea of History in Antiquity* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1982), pp. 112–17, 126–28.

60. In both respects this critique conforms to the standard apologetical critique of pagan religion; e.g., Tatian *Or.* 21–26 and Athenag. *Emb.* 11–18.

61. It is limited primarily by the exclusion of invention, the first and most important of the five traditional parts of rhetoric in antiquity. Book 4 touches on arrangements, memory, and delivery, but its real and basic concern is style. I have argued ("Subject and Structure", pp. 118–21) that Books 1–3 are concerned with the traditional area called invention, invention as transformed by Augustine's Christianity. But Augustine considers only Book 4, which excludes invention, to treat of eloquence or rhetoric. The exclusion of invention is an essential element in the ancient philosophic polemic against rhetoric that began with the Socrates of Plato's dialogues. I will deal with the importance of this polemic in the *DDC* in a subsequent paper, "Wisdom and Eloquence in Augustine's *De doctrina christiana*."

62. See A. N. Wilder, *Early Christian Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), ch. 1 and Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, p. 120.

63. In conjunction with Augustine's analogy (*Proem* 9) between what he intends to teach here and teaching a person to read rather than just pronouncing the words, I believe this solves the disagreement between Marrou's argument that this Christian culture is for all rather than priests (as Hill and Eggersdorfer maintain) or monks (Gerhard B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959], pp. 373–79).

64. On the influence of the *DDC*, in addition to the works cited in n. 3 above, Murphy (n. 1 above) says that "it provided the basic statement of a Christian homiletic until the 13th century" (p. 407). Kennedy (*Classical Rhetoric*, p. 159) agrees; but he finds that it was unknown in England after Bede (p. 182), and that its influence was reborn in modern times in Fenelon's *Dialogues* (pp. 223–25).

65. See Helmut Rahn, "Die rhetorische Kultur der Antike," *Altsprachliche Unterricht* 10 (1967), 23–49, Marrou, *St. Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris, 1939), pp. 3–9 and esp. 85–89, and Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), Vol. 1, 286–331.

66. That the idea of history as goal-oriented was a product of early Christian rhetoric is argued in my *Development of the Idea of History*, esp. pp. 129–34.

67. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Third Biennial Meeting of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, Madison, Wisconsin, April 14, 1981. The research was begun during 1979–80 when I was a Mellon Fellow in Early Christian Humanism at the Catholic University of America. I would like to thank the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Catholic University of America, and Professor John F. Wippel for their support of my work. I would also like to thank the *Philosophy and Rhetoric* reader for helpful suggestions.