

HELLENISTIC THINKING ABOUT ART

Gerald A. Press

University of California-Riverside

Writers on the history of aesthetics or ancient aesthetics tend to treat the period from the death of Aristotle in 322 B.C. to the death of Plotinus in 269 A.D.—that is, the Hellenistic Age—in one of two ways. The first is to ignore the period altogether, as for example J. G. Warry, who deals only with Plato and Aristotle since

In reading the treatises of later Greek writers, especially those who wrote under the Roman Empire, one cannot help feeling that for them, as for so many critics of modern times, art had become a substitute for life; and, indeed, if it was not a substitute for life, what purpose could it have?¹

And even among those who do not give in to this temptation the period is usually relegated but a few pages in a much longer work,² and then embodies the second tendency, which is to see the whole period as nothing more than Plotinus³ or as a long preparation for Plotinus,⁴ who alone gives us “a fully developed philosophy of beauty.”⁵

This general disinterest in the period seems to derive basically from the lack of any systematic and philosophical treatment of art; and it is true that

not between Plato and Plotinus was the problem of its value on an ultimate scale of measurement pressed home, nor that final curiosity satisfied which does not rest short of finding beauty's real place, as distinguished from its logical compartment, on a map of reality.⁶

Yet the results of taking this dearth of philosophic literature too seriously are ignorance of the wealth and complexity of the thinking about art that did go on and failure to appreciate the uniqueness of the period and its real contribution to the development of aesthetics in Western civilization.

The problem is that the standpoints from which the period has been viewed sort out the materials in an unhelpful way. Chambers' *Cycles of Taste*,⁷ for example, is interested in the transformations of “taste” and so he focusses on the evidences of public or popular sentiment toward art but ignores almost completely the formal and technical matters in which we might also be interested. W. R. Roberts' *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*⁸ is included here more as a symptom than as a relevant work; his quite interesting study of the principles and methods of rhetoric and literary criticism is one of many of its kind (though better than most), scholarly but without visible relation to other contemporaneous currents of thought. William Knight's “Outlines of the History of

Gerald A. Press is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of California, Riverside, and Research Associate at the University of California, Berkeley. His main interests are ancient philosophy and the history of ancient culture.

Aesthetic" is Part I of *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*;⁹ it is, as the title might suggest, Hegelian in approach and thus discounts the period entirely since only "systems" are relevant and with the exception of Plotinus there are none to be found here. Also in the Hegelian vein is Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic*, which I shall feel justified in ignoring since he himself admits that he knows nothing first-hand about the period.¹⁰

Perhaps the historical approach is to be the most fruitful, but Beardsley's *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present* is little more than a set of summaries in chronological order of the treatises from the period which have come down to us. Erwin Panofsky's *Idea*,¹¹ a brief history of the role of the idea in art theory, is stimulating and sensitive but is quite limited in its scope. The best available work is doubtless Gilbert and Kuhn, *A History of Esthetic*, and we could only wish that there were more of it.

The problem, then, is what to call the subject of such an inquiry. Relevant and important reflection on art need not be done in systematic or philosophical theories, and it is admitted, at any rate, that there are no systematic theories of art or beauty besides Plotinus, so the term "aesthetics" will hardly do; nor is "philosophy of the beautiful" really acceptable, since, as will be observed later, the more important and influential thinking about art is done, not by philosophers, but by the artists themselves and by other educated persons. Perhaps, then, just the phrase "thinking about art" will do, recognizing the vagueness of the phrase but hoping that that very vagueness may give a latitude to the inquiry that will help to reveal the contribution of this period to the continuing dialogue about art and artistry in Western thought.

"Historical knowledge," John Herman Randall has written,¹²

is not in itself an evaluation, and the conviction that it is sufficient is a fallacy from which our present schools have wisely sought liberation. But at the same time it is a necessary condition of any responsible and properly critical judgment of value.

The difference between the history of philosophy and political or social history is, of course, that the "facts" and "events" with which the latter are concerned are for the former "ideas" and "theories" whose relations and ramifications must be explained. The history of philosophy is, in its way, more difficult, for there are no standard methods for verification of fact nor is there common agreement among historians on what the facts and crucial events are or on the magnitude of influential figures. These problems are even more pronounced when one turns to the Hellenistic period for much of the "data"—original works—are available to us only in fragments quoted by other authors whose credibility is often doubtful or are lost altogether and known only through reports which themselves may be inaccurate.

With such warnings I propose an historical thesis about Hellenistic thinking about art: that the marked differences between Plotinus, on the

one hand, and Plato and Aristotle on the other—those three philosophers generally considered the only “real” ancient aestheticians—are to be understood as a development leading to a transformation of the basic concept in thinking about art from imitation to imagination; and that the period is important historically since the restricted Hellenic notion of that art which was philosophically important, namely Poetic (including poetry, drama, and, perhaps, rhetoric), is expanded to include painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and history, at least the first three of which were considered crafts in the earlier period, and their artificers only slightly more than laborers. In the following pages I make no claims to comprehensiveness, nor do I intend to do more than lend the thesis a certain plausibility. My aim is rather to suggest some ways in which the evidence may be interpreted and some directions in which more comprehensive and detailed work might profitably be done.

It is a fact frequently observed that with the exception of Plotinus the Hellenistic period produced no profound, systematic treatises about art or beauty. This apparent decline of philosophic interest in art can be traced to two features of the intellectual terrain that are almost synonymous with the beginning of Hellenistic thought. In the first place, beginning with the death of Aristotle, philosophy fragments into “schools”—the Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, Epicurean, Cynic, and others—whose numerous and vehement disputations with each other tended to become at once more technical and further removed from the understanding (or interest) of any but the philosophers themselves—a phenomenon not unknown, one might think, in contemporary philosophy. Philosophy of this sort tended, then as now, to have little influence outside the “schools” in which it was practiced.

There seems to have been, however, much philosophic interest in art. We are told that Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, wrote treatises on *Homeric Problems* (five books) and *On Listening to Poetry*; his successor, Cleanthes of Assos, wrote *On Poetry*; and Chrysippus of Soli, third head of the Stoa, wrote *On the Poems of Philomathes*, *On the Way in which One must Listen to Poetry* (two books), and *On the Critics According to Diodorus*.¹³ The Epicurean, Philodemus of Gadara, who founded an Epicurean school at Naples about 80 B.C., is reported to have written *On Poems* and *On Music*, which are lost, and *On Rhetoric*, substantial fragments of which have come down to us.¹⁴ Though no whole treatises survive, thinking tends, as de Lacy’s reconstruction of a Stoic poetics¹⁵ shows, to be a breakdown and classification of the parts of a poem and their function with respect to the whole. They are highly elaborated technical treatises on poetics conceived as didactic and as a substitute for discursive thought.

The second cause for the apparent decline of philosophic interest in art is the growth of rhetoric and its challenge to the credentials of philosophy as sole qualified dispenser of education.¹⁶ The beginnings of

this controversy may be seen in Plato's polemics against the Sophists and in the challenge to philosophy posed by the school of Isocrates at Athens in competition with Aristotle's Lyceum; for, according to Isocrates,

he (the teacher) must in himself set such an example that the students who are molded by him and are able to imitate him will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm greater than that of the others.¹⁷

So strong had this challenge become that Cicero could argue in the first century B.C. that, although philosophy and rhetoric are really and originally but two aspects of one and the same enterprise, the Socrates found in Plato's dialogues

is the source from which has sprung the undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak.¹⁸

And Seneca, seventy years later, upbraids the philosophers for envying and hence seeking to imitate the rhetoricians.

Think how much superfluous and unpractical matter the philosophers contain! Of their own accord they also have descended to establishing nice divisions of syllables, to determining the true meaning of conjunctions and prepositions; they have been envious of the scholars, envious of the mathematicians. They have taken over into their own art all the superfluities of these other arts; and the result is that they know more about careful speaking than about careful living.¹⁹

The encroachment of rhetoric on the domain of philosophy had its effects, then, on philosophy; and no less did it have its effects on thinking about art. The orientation toward audience effect, which is recognized already by both Plato and Aristotle in rhetoric, runs counter to Greek classicism, which focusses its attention on the work of art itself, and perhaps explains why in his organization of the sciences Aristotle locates rhetoric in the domain of moral philosophy, being subservient to politics, rather than in the domain of poetic. Indeed this difference between rhetoric and the classical view of the arts was one of the grounds on which Plato could deny that rhetoricians were artists. Moreover, it is in rhetoric that we first see a view of "art" as learned, that is, as acquired by practice or by imitation of other artists, in marked contrast to the "inspiration" which Plato sees as its basis in the *Ion*.²⁰ The object of imitation, then, is no longer the eternal Forms of Plato nor even the human actions from the universal applicability of which, according to Aristotle, men may be purged of their feelings of pity and fear. The object of imitation is thus, as it were, pulled down, degraded, from the heavens to the earth.²¹

More interesting, perhaps, than the fortunes of thinking about art in philosophy is the immense new critical and technical literature which begins in the third century B.C. The philosophers too are involved in

this, as was observed earlier of the Stoics and Epicureans, but their attention seems to be focussed on poetics and perhaps rhetoric. And in this traditional sphere of poetics there are treatises by Horace, *On the Art of Poetry*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition*, Demetrius of Phaleron, *On Style*, and Longinus' treatise *On the Sublime*, which is really a handbook for attaining sublimity in writing rather than a theoretic work about the aesthetic quality of sublimity. There are numerous treatises on rhetoric, including the immense *Institutes of Oratory* of Quintilian and Cicero's trilogy, *De Oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator*, in which he proposed to treat rhetoric respectively in theory, in historical development, and in ideal manifestation. Moreover, there are for the first time treatises about history-writing, examples of which are Dionysius' *Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius* and Lucian's *How to Write History*. I have mentioned here only the most famous treatises; there are, of course, many other less famous ones as well.

Besides these technical writings in fields already recognized as legitimate in Hellenic Greece, however, there are also technical works being written on "arts" that seemed beneath the dignity of a thinker in the Athens of Plato or Aristotle. In the first century B.C. Vitruvius wrote his lengthy treatise *On Architecture*, and listed in the Preface to Book VII no less than forty writers from whose works he had drawn. Aristoxenus, a later Peripatetic, wrote an important work on Music called the *Harmonics*. And according to Pliny there were also treatises on painting, sculpture, and even on horsemanship.²² What is significant about these writings is that they were written not by philosophers or, for the most part, by amateurs, but by accomplished professional artists. This wealth of technical writing indicates the extent to which attention is being paid to the details of art understood to be teachable, as, it has been observed above, was rhetoric.

Moreover, the variety of these writings indicates a broadening of the concept of art (as distinguished from craft) to include genres far removed from the sphere of poetics, to which, on the whole, Plato and Aristotle restricted themselves. So respectable have these fields become that a dyspeptic (and not uncontemporary) Seneca feels constrained to argue for the exclusion of painting, sculpture, and marble-working along with wrestling, perfuming, and cooking from "the list of the liberal arts."

For what "liberal" element is there in these ravenous takers of emetics, whose bodies are fed to fatness while their minds are thin and dull. Or do we really believe that the training which they give us is "liberal" for the young men of Rome who used to be taught by our ancestors to stand straight and hurl a spear, to wield a pike, to guide a horse, and to handle weapons.²³

Similarly Philostratus in the third century A.D. indicts all the arts except philosophy as concerned solely to make money,

not only the base mechanic arts, but of the rest those which are esteemed liberal arts, as well as those which only border on being liberal . . . and by liberal arts I mean poetry, music, astronomy, the art of the sophist and of the orator, the merely forensic kinds excepted; and by the arts which border upon being liberal I mean those of the painter, modeller, sculptor, navigator, agriculturist . . . for these arts are not very inferior to the liberal professions.²⁴

The recognition of many arts is patent. Vitruvius goes so far as to argue that the architect must be knowledgeable in all of them if he is to be a good artist;²⁵ and Pliny observes that the painter Pamphilus “was the first painter highly educated in all branches of learning, especially arithmetic and geometry, without the aid of which he maintained art could not attain perfection.”²⁶

The person of the artist, then, has come to be of some concern in Hellenistic thinking about art, and contemporaneous histories of the arts and of artists tended to enhance the awareness of the artist's role. Although their works have not been preserved, Xenocrates of Sikyon (fl. c. 280 B.C.) wrote a history of art and Duris of Samos (fl. c. 300 B.C.), a pupil of Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor as head of the Lyceum, both a *Lives of the Painters* and a *Lives of the Sculptors*. The works of these two historians were combined by Antigonus of Karystos (fl. c. 260 B.C.) in a work entitled *A Collection of Marvelous Stories*, which by way of Varro was one of the major sources of Pliny's histories of the arts and artists.²⁷ These histories tend to see the development of an art genre in terms of the additions and discoveries made by successive artists,²⁸ and thus again to refocus the attention of one's thinking about art from the art work to the artist. According to Chambers,

the emergence of the individual artist occurred from the fifth century B.C. onwards. It was marked surely enough by the gradual disappearance of the Classical spirit in the arts. The first sign was the acknowledgment of the artist's personality and a betterment of his social condition. In very early antiquity the artist was not even known by name.²⁹

Along with the increased concern for technique that is to be observed in the extensive technical literature of the period, and perhaps arising from it, there is an increasing attention paid to detail in art works. Apelles is said to have painted portraits

so absolutely lifelike that, incredible as it sounds . . . one of those persons who prophesy people's future by their countenance, pronounced from their portraits either the year of their deaths hereafter or the number of years they had already lived.³⁰

So realistic were these works that numerous stories were abroad of animals, men, and even other artists being deceived by well-wrought sculptures or well-executed paintings.³¹ Along with realism in depiction went a realism of subject-matter for art works, such that Piraeicus became famous for his paintings of

barbers' shops and cobblers' stalls, asses, viands, and the like, consequently receiving a Greek name meaning “painter of sordid subjects”; in these, however, he gives exquisite pleasure, and indeed they fetched higher prices than the largest works of many masters.³²

This realism seems to have gone so far that the sculptor Lysippus explained the greater symmetry of his works saying "that whereas his predecessors had made men as they really were, he made them as they appeared to be,"³³ for an artist ought to imitate nature and not another artist. And, again according to Pliny, it was Lysistratus, Lysippus' brother, who first among sculptors sought likenesses rather than ideal depiction as had been sought before.³⁴ Here, then, can be seen another stage in the "degradation" of imitation in art; it is brought further down toward the earth, and now to the most ordinary things.

The realism in art that has been discussed, and the great advances in technique that were observed earlier, seem to lead not only the writers but also the artistic and art-loving public to a concern for novelty that is not unknown in our own day. Perhaps, as the popular view has it, this is a sure sign of the decadence of Hellenistic civilization, but it is quite clear that in the Hellenistic period connoisseurship and dilettantism were the trademarks of the nobility and of the upper strata of society generally;³⁵ so much so that Pliny berates the collectors for defection from the old ways³⁶ and Lucian sadly concludes his *Zeuxis or Antiochus*,

It is time for me to consider whether my army (sc. art) is like that of Antiochus—in general inadequate for the fight, but with some elephants, some queer hobgoblins to see, and some conjuring tricks. It is these qualities at any rate that everyone praises. The things I had confidence in are of no account at all to them. They marvel only because a female Hippocentaur has been painted, and they think it novel and portentous, as indeed it is. The rest of Zeuxis' work was wasted, I suppose. But no, not wasted—you are real artists and examine each detail with craftsmen's eyes. My only hope is that my show may be worthy of its audience.

But the interest in novelty, whatever its moral significance, also tends to focus the attention even more pointedly on the artist, for the novelty is certainly in the workmanship and not in the subject; and perhaps from this close attention to the contribution that the artist as an individual makes to the work there arises now an awareness of inventiveness or of genius—an attribute patently of the artist himself, of the artist's creative power, and there begins to appear a clear-cut shift from the classical Greek attention only to the work in thinking about art.

Genius is recognized as a gift of nature, and hence unteachable, the concomitant of what can be achieved by art, which can be taught and learned. Lucian observes that the historian requires

these two supreme qualities: political understanding and power of expression; the former is an unteachable gift of nature, while power of expression may come through a deal of practice, continued toil, and imitation of the ancients.³⁷

The views on the nature of art that, as discussed earlier, came to thinking about art from rhetoric, are now clearly challenged. The man who would be an architect, says Vitruvius, "must have both a natural gift and also a readiness to learn."³⁸ And genius is seen to be related to the portrayal and embodiment of emotion.

To return to Timanthes—he had a very high degree of genius. Orators have sung the praises of Iphigenia, who stands at the altar awaiting her doom; the artist has shown all present full of sorrow, and especially her uncle, and has exhausted all the indications of grief, yet has veiled the countenance of her father himself, whom he was unable adequately to portray.³⁹

With growing awareness of genius, a reaction against the realism of the earlier period sets in; for genius is seen in an artist's knowledge of when to take his hand away from a work, and as Pliny remarks,

It is also a very unusual fact that the last works of artists and their unfinished pictures . . . are more admired than those which they finished, because in them are seen the preliminary drawings left invisible and the artist's actual thoughts, and in the midst of approval's beguilement we feel regret that the artist's hand while engaged in the work was removed by death.⁴⁰

Genius, then, is early recognized in its relation to the mental endowment of the artist; thus Vitruvius, writing in the first century B.C., could observe that plan, elevation, and perspective in architecture

arise from imagination and invention. Imagination rests upon the attention directed with minute and observant fervour to the charming effect proposed. Invention, however, is the solution of obscure problems; the treatment of a new undertaking disclosed by an active intelligence.⁴¹

Here, then, in principle, is the challenge to imitation itself as the central concept in thinking about art. Perhaps in the acceptance of new "arts" such as architecture and music the notion of imitation of nature had to be stretched so far as to lose its efficacy in explanation altogether. Perhaps the growing recognition of the artist's unique, personal contribution to the work and its relation to his creative, intellectual or spiritual capacities proved too profound to continue thinking of him as an "imitator." Certainly, however, the progressive degradation of the object of imitation, as it has been observed, since Aristotle, has been paralleled by an upgrading of the person called "imitator," the artist with his abilities. And finally, in the third century A.D. the challenge to Imitation is issued by Imagination in the great work of Philostratus, and I take the liberty of quoting it at length.

"Without exception I maintain," replied Apollonius, "that whereas in other lands statuary has scrupulously observed decency and fitness, you rather make ridicule of the gods than really believe in them." "Your artists, then, like Phidias," said the other, "and like Praxiteles went up, I suppose, to heaven and took a copy of the forms of the gods, and then reproduced these by their art, or was there any other influence which presided over and guided their moulding?" "There was," said Apollonius, "and an influence pregnant with wisdom and genius." "What was that?" said the other, "for I do not think you can adduce any except imitation." "Imagination," said Apollonius, "wrought these works, a wiser and subtler artist by far than imitation; for imitation can only create as its handiwork what it has seen, but imagination equally what it has not seen; for it will conceive of its ideal with reference to the reality, and imitation is often baffled by terror, but imagination by nothing; for it marches undismayed to the goal which it has itself laid down. When you entertain a notion of Zeus you must, I suppose, envisage him along with heaven and seasons and stars, as Phidias in his day endeavored to do, and if you would fashion an

image of Athena you must image in your mind armies and cunning, and handicrafts, and how she leapt out of Zeus himself. But if you make a hawk or an owl or a wolf or a dog, and put it in your temples instead of Hermes or Athena or Apollo, your animals and your birds may be esteemed and of much price as likenesses, but the gods will be lowered in their dignity.⁴²

The subject to which the artist is to pay attention in his making is now clearly shifted from any world outside the artist, be it real, or, as with Plato, ideal, to the inward world of the mind and of imagination. Similarly, when Cicero sought to portray the ideal orator he described him as an idea not to be found in reality, but in the mind and the imagination as, he says, are the objects which all great artists look at when creating their masterpieces.⁴³

Finally, in Longinus, the transition is completed. His treatise *On the Sublime* is usually considered important as an ancient anticipation of the modern concern with aesthetic qualities, especially in regard to the eighteenth century discussions of "the beautiful and the sublime." But his treatise is really not a theoretical one; Longinus has no philosophy of art nor of beauty. *On the Sublime* seems, as was remarked earlier, to be a work like many others of the age, a technical work, a handbook on how to achieve certain artistic effects, in this case sublimity in writing. Its importance for the present purposes, however, is far different; for with Longinus we have for the first time art discussed no longer in the language of imitation, but now in the language of imagination. Like all terms that are central to the thinking of a period or school, imagination must be dealt with carefully, and Longinus must be sensitive to the nuances of its usage.⁴⁴

Weight, grandeur, and energy in writing are very largely produced, dear pupil, by the use of "images." (That at least is what some people call the actual mental pictures.) For the term imagination is applied in general to an idea which enters the mind from any source and engenders speech, but the word has now come to be used predominantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your audience. The imagination means one thing in rhetoric and another in poetry, you will yourself detect, and also that the object of poetry is to enthrall, of prose-writing to present things vividly, though both indeed aim at this latter and excited feeling.⁴⁵

The embodiment of emotion, which for Longinus is the mark of genius, and its evocation in the audience, which is the aim of poetry, are thus subsumed to imagination. On a lost passage from Euripides' *Phaethos* he remarks, "Would you not say that the writer's feelings are aboard the car, sharing the perilous flight of those winged horses? Never could he have shown so much imagination had he not run neck and neck with those celestial doings."⁴⁶ The aim of rhetoric is truth and in rhetoric, according to Longinus, "the most perfect effect of imagination is always one of reality and truth."⁴⁷ Perfect precision tends to triviality, he contends,⁴⁸ but under the influence of imagination "the technique is concealed in a halo of brilliance."⁴⁹

It may seem odd that a study of Hellenistic thinking about art should stop short of Plotinus; but perhaps by such an unorthodox move it can be emphasized yet again what has been the objective of the inquiry all along: to see developmentally the great contributions of the period not only to the philosophy of art and beauty as those contributions are somehow summed up in Plotinus, but also to the history of aesthetics generally. The ideas of imitation and imagination have been recurrent problems in the history of aesthetics and in the history of philosophy generally. I have not attempted here a detailed analysis of either, and it may be doubted whether the paucity of our resources would permit such an analysis of the idea of imagination in Hellenistic thought. But the suggestions that I have offered about the transition from one basic idea to the other and about the currents of thought and art that contributed to that transition may, I hope, serve as a stimulus to further study of the period and a renewed appreciation of its unique and formidable contributions to the history of Western Culture.

NOTES

¹ *Greek Aesthetic Theories* (N. Y.: Barnes and Noble, 1962), p. 2.

² In William Knight's *The Philosophy of the Beautiful* (N. Y.: Scribner's, 1891), for example, it gets eight pages out of the two hundred eighty of the first volume, "Outlines of the History of Aesthetic." Katharine Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn devote thirty-two pages in five hundred and ninety, but feel compelled to justify their very inclusion of the period. "And yet in spite of the lack of any first-rate systematic aesthetic philosophy between Aristotle and Plotinus, a brief account must be given." *A History of Esthetics* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1954), p. 89.

³ Knight, *op. cit.*

⁴ E.g., Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present* (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1966) and Gilbert and Kuhn, *op. cit.*

⁵ Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁶ Gilbert and Kuhn, *ibid.*

⁷ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928).

⁸ (N. Y.: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963).

⁹ (N. Y.: Scribner's, 1891).

¹⁰ (N. Y.: World Publishing Co., 1961), p. xi.

¹¹ (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968).

¹² *How Philosophy Uses Its Past* (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 14.

¹³ These are according to Diogenes Laertius: Zeno, VII. 4; Cleanthes, VII. 175; Chrysippus, VII. 200.

¹⁴ Phillip de Lacy, *Philodemus: On Methods of Inference* (Philadelphia: American Philological Association, 1941), p. 7.

¹⁵ "Stoic Views of Poetry," *American Journal of Philology* 69 (1948), 241-271.

¹⁶ On the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric, the pioneering study of Hans von Arnim, *Leben und werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1898), "Einleitung: Sophistik, rhetorik, philosophie in ihrem kampf um die jugenbildung," was expanded and integrated into a more comprehensive interpretation of the history of Greek culture by Werner Jaeger in *Paideia* (see esp. the chapters on the Sophists, Plato's *Protagoras*, and the two chapters on Isocrates). See also Henri Marrou, *A History of Education in Antiquity* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), Ch. 10, and now Samuel IJsseling's *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), chapters II and III.

¹⁷ Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, 18. For convenience, this and all subsequent translations are from Loeb editions.

¹⁸ Cicero, *De Oratore*, 3.16.61; cf. 3.35.140-141 where, reiterating the original unity of rhetoric and philosophy, Cicero goes on to argue that, "Accordingly, when Aristotle observed that Isocrates succeeded in obtaining a distinguished set of pupils by means of abandoning legal and political subjects and devoting his discourses to empty elegance of style, he himself suddenly altered almost the whole of his own system of training, and quoted a line from the *Philoctetes* with a slight modification: the hero in the tragedy said that it was a disgrace for him to keep silent and suffer barbarians to speak, but Aristotle put it 'suffer Isocrates to speak'; and consequently he put the whole of his system of philosophy in a polished and brilliant form, and linked the scientific study of facts with practice in style."

¹⁹ Seneca, *Epistle* 88.42.

²⁰ 533D-534B *inter alia*.

²¹ An excellent discussion, not only of this moment in the history of the concept of imitation, but of its whole ancient history is to be found in Richard P. McKeon, "Literary Criticism and the Concept of Imitation in Antiquity," *Modern Philology* 34 (1936), 1-35.

²² "Apelles singly contributed more to painting than all the other artists put together, also publishing volumes containing the principles of painting." *Natural History* 35.36.79. "Xenocrates, who was a pupil of Tisicrates, or of Euthykrates, surpassed both of the last mentioned in the number of his statues; and he also wrote books about his art." *Ibid.* 34.19.83, and cf. 36.4.39. "Boryaxis likewise did the mounted statue of Simon, who wrote the first treatise on Horsemanship." *Ibid.* 34.19.76.

²³ *Epistle* 88.18-19.

²⁴ *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 8.7.

²⁵ *On Architecture* 1.1.1-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 35.36.76.

²⁷ K. Jex-Blake and E. Sellers, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London: Macmillan, 1896), "Introduction."

²⁸ E.g., from *Nat. Hist.* 34.19: "Phidias is deservedly deemed to have first revealed the capabilities and indicated the methods of statuary." (54) Polyclitus "alone of mankind is deemed by means of one work of art to have created the art itself." (55) "A discovery that was entirely his own is the art of making statues throw their weight on one leg." (56) "Myron is the first sculptor to have enlarged the scope of realism." (58)

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 88.

³⁰ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 35.36.88.

³¹ Crows tried to land on a painted stage set (*Nat. Hist.* 35.7.23); birds tried to eat a picture of grapes by Zeuxis (25.36.65), and Parrhasius painted a stage curtain so realistic that Zeuxis himself was fooled and asked that the curtain be drawn (35.36.88).

³² *Nat. Hist.* 35.37.112.

³³ *Nat. Hist.* 35.19.65.

³⁴ *Nat. Hist.* 35.44.153.

³⁵ Chambers, *op. cit.*, 34-88 offers extensive proof of this in his collection of information concerning "collectomania," dilettantism, tourist's guides, guidebooks to art works, etc. According to Gilbert and Kuhn (*op. cit.*, 89), "The new preoccupation with art was of other sorts: one confiscated it; collected it; hired a single servant-artist or thousands of slaves to bring it into being; or one composed epigrams and flowery speeches in praise of it and so showed oneself off in its presence."

³⁶ *Nat. Hist.* 35.2.4-6.

³⁷ Lucian, *How to Write History*, 34.

³⁸ *On Architecture* 1.1.3.

³⁹ *Nat. Hist.* 35.36.74.

⁴⁰ *Nat. Hist.* 35.40.145; for when to stop working, see 35.36.80-81.

⁴¹ *On Architecture* 1.2.2.

⁴² *Life of Apollonius* 6.19.

⁴³ Cicero, *Orator* 2.7-3.9, which concludes, "Accordingly, as there is something perfect and surpassing in the case of sculpture and painting—an intellectual idea by reference to which the artist represents those objects which do not themselves appear to the eye, so with our minds we conceive the ideal of perfect eloquence, but with our ears we catch only the

copy.”

⁴⁴ The Greek term for imagination is PHANTASIA; it is originally a noun meaning “image” in the mind, or, as it was used centrally in the Stoic discussions of knowledge, “presentation.” But as thought began to gravitate toward the mental faculties it acquired new meanings as it was applied in new contexts. Thus, even in Aristotle (*De Anima* III.3-8) it is used as the “faculty” of images, that is “the imaging faculty,” or, as it is customarily translated, imagination. But it always retains its original sense, in appropriate contexts, of “images,” as in the following passage.

⁴⁵ *On the Sublime* 15.1-2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 15.4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 15.8.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 33.2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 15.11.