

The State of the Question in the Study of Plato

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The sheer magnitude of the scholarly literature on Plato makes its assessment difficult.¹ Even if we leave aside editions and translations, the study of Plato is carried on in many languages other than the more familiar English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish² and by scholars in an astonishing diversity of fields: anthropology, archeology, art history, classical philology, city planning, drama, education, geography, history, law, literature, mathematics, medicine, music, penology, philosophy, politics, psychology, religious studies, rhetoric, and sociology. At least partly for this reason, there has been no really comprehensive review of the literature recently and it is questionable whether such a thing is even possible.³

The problem can be reduced to more manageable proportions by distinguishing among the diverse purposes for which scholars study Plato's dialogues. For a substantial amount of the Plato literature is essentially concerned with discovering Plato's answers to the questions of concern to contemporary scholars and researchers, or, more plainly, "the enterprise of mining Plato for the purposes of one's own philosophizing."⁴ Guthrie is correct that there is nothing intrinsically better about what he calls, on the other hand, "the historical approach" or "a scholar's approach," but the difference is often overlooked. The historical and scholarly approach has its own aims and uses, and is the concern here.⁵

Of that still substantial Plato literature which is left, there is a further distinction to be made between the study of *Platonism*, which involves study of the dialogues along with

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many other factors, texts, and influences, and the study and interpretation of the dialogues in and for themselves.⁶ That is to say, the subject of these pages is the state of the question about how to understand and interpret the dialogues of Plato, to discover their meaning in their own context, in terms of their own aims, functions, structures, and principles.⁷

Having set these limits to the inquiry, the first problem is that interpreting Plato's dialogues is more difficult than interpreting the texts of most other philosophers. They are not, at least *prima facie*, like the treatises philosophers more often write; one thinks immediately of Aristotle, but also of Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza, Locke and Hume, Kant and Hegel. On the other hand, they are also not like the philosophical dialogues of Cicero, Augustine, or Berkeley, in which the characters are little more than masks for particular doctrines and arguments.⁸ In some respects Plato's dialogues actually seem more like the writings of Dante, Thomas More, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, in which the author has deliberately made it difficult to determine his own views.⁹

Perhaps the most accurate word about the study of Plato is found in Olympiodorus and the *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*:

Just before his death Plato saw in a dream that he became a swan and, leaping from tree to tree, he frustrated the attempts of the bird-catchers to hunt him down.¹⁰

Nevertheless, during most of its history, interpretation of Plato has oscillated between two poles.¹¹ For the most part, it has been what may be called dogmatic or doctrinal;¹² that is, it has been assumed that Plato's thought consists of a more or less systematic body of doctrines which it is the primary function of the dialogues to communicate along with the arguments that Plato believes to show the truth of these doctrines. The crucial point is that the focus of such interpretations is—even (and especially) when the interpreters disagree—on discovering Plato's doctrines. The other pole, the skeptical, emphasizes the inconclusive endings of many dialogues, Socrates' perpetual questioning, and the wealth of inconsistencies, ambiguities, and apparently weak or invalid arguments, and claims that Plato does not have any settled doctrines, but always remains in doubt or open to further inquiry and argument. It is worth noting that, as an anti-dogmatic position, the skeptical is nevertheless defined by the concept of dogma and is, therefore, essentially dogma-centered. It is a position that has recurred from the New Academy of Arcesilaos (316–242 B.C.E.) and Carneades (214–129 B.C.E.), to Philo of Larissa (160–c. 80 B.C.E.) and his student, Cicero, and via Cicero in Augustine, Bruni, Vives, Melanchthon, and Montaigne in the

Renaissance rebirth of ancient skepticism.¹³ The dominant tradition, however, has usually been dogmatic.

For most of its history, interpretation has also not taken the literary and dramatic characteristics of the dialogues as essential. After Schleiermacher pointed out the decisive importance of character and situation for understanding the claims and arguments in the dialogues,¹⁴ a growing number of scholars have paid attention to them. Until the middle of this century, however, dissidents such as Stenzel,¹⁵ Schaerer,¹⁶ Friedländer,¹⁷ Woodbridge,¹⁸ and Stefanini¹⁹ had limited and mostly local influence on the general direction of Platonic studies.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION AT MID-CENTURY

The prevailing view in the middle of the twentieth century, consistent with both of these long-standing interpretive commitments, could be defined by six main points:

(1) Doctrine. Plato had doctrines, such as the Ideas, the immortality of the soul, knowledge as recollection, the ideal state, and the ladder of loves, and a system in which those doctrines were embedded.²⁰ This view was widely held both because it was the mainstream of traditional interpretation since antiquity and because of Zeller's powerful and influential claim that having a doctrinal system was what it was to be a philosopher.²¹

The questions that interested interpreters were, (1) in cases of unclarity or apparent disagreement between one dialogue and another, "What *are* Plato's doctrines?" And (2), in light of the arguments that Plato seemed to present, "Are these doctrines right or wrong, good or bad?"

(2) Development. Plato's doctrines and system developed from an early period, in which he was rather a Socratic, to a middle period, in which he became critical of Socrates' ideas and began to work out his own, to a late period, in which he carried out, again critically, the consequences of his ideas and constructed his own system. This was a persuasive view because it seems natural that a thinker's views should change and develop over a long, productive life and because it promised to resolve problems about aporetic dialogues (they were 'early' and 'Socratic') and, especially, instances of apparent doctrinal disagreement. Although the developmental view has all but dominated recent Plato studies, an alternative has persisted, the unitarian view first powerfully espoused by Paul Shorey.²² Platonic unitarians, however, tend to accept the essentially doctrinal orientation.

The developmental view of Plato originated in the nineteenth century²³ and the main questions, still being asked in

the mid-twentieth century, were, "How did Plato's doctrines develop?"²⁴ and, underlying this, "What is the order of composition of the dialogues?" Because stylometry had come to be accepted as the standard for determining the order of composition, "What chronological order does stylometry give us?" has been a recurrent question as well.²⁵

(3) Didactic function. The sole or main purpose of the dialogues is to teach or communicate Plato's doctrines. What *else* could be the function of a philosophical text? The question is, "What doctrine is being communicated in especially problematic, aporetic dialogues?"

(4) Probative arguments. The arguments presented are Plato's own arguments for the doctrines that he means to communicate. It seems obvious that we readers are meant to see Socrates (the Eleatic Stranger, Parmenides, or the Athenian Stranger) as right and to accept what he presents. The questions that interested interpreters about the arguments in the dialogues were, "Are the arguments valid or not? And if an argument is found to be invalid, then what conclusion should we draw about the doctrine it is supporting or about Plato's logical abilities?"²⁶

(5) Seriousness. The dialogues are essentially serious attempts to articulate, demonstrate, and communicate Plato's doctrines, rather than play, humor, or irony. The question that interested scholars about the obvious cases of play, humor, and irony in the dialogues was, "How can we read through it? What doctrine is masked by this levity?"

(6) Treatises. Given all of the above, the dialogues are disguised treatises; their literary and dramatic characteristics are merely formal, at best, unimportant sugar-coating, at worst, confusing and inhibiting.²⁷ In most dialogues Plato's doctrines and arguments are presented by Socrates; in other words, he is Plato's mouthpiece. In the few dialogues where Socrates is absent or silent, the Eleatic Stranger, Parmenides, or the Athenian Stranger are Plato's mouthpieces.²⁸

The questions were, "What theories and ideas is Plato attempting to teach us by way of this merely formally literary and dramatic composition? Who is his mouthpiece in the particular case whose views and arguments we may attribute to Plato?" As was the case with humor and irony, one looked not at it, but through it, in order to reach the desired outcome, Plato's doctrines.

Such were the prevailing beliefs and questions of interest to Plato scholars at the mid-century, but commitments have been shifting. Many cooperating causes can be cited; for example, a more critical and historical orientation made some scholars suspicious of anachronistic or retrojective assumptions. Pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology made others more attentive to the literary and dramatic characteris-

tics of the dialogues, to indirect forms of communication, and to the variety of functions that texts could have. Semiotics' attention to differences in kinds of writing and audiences also increased attention to the dialogue as a form of communication essentially different from treatises.

In any case, beginning in the late 1950s, important criticisms of the prevailing views were articulated, alternative views were proposed, and the literary and dramatic orientations began to have greater influence.²⁹ In 1964, Brumbaugh justified his endeavor by noting, among other things, the importance of literary criticism to interpreting the dialogues although it "still seems dubiously imaginative to most British and American philologists and historians working on Plato."³⁰ By 1968 Rosen could speak of an opposition between two different approaches, one which "recognize[s] the central importance of Plato's use of the dialogue form," and another, which puts "emphasis upon epistemology, logic, and linguistic analysis."³¹ In 1973, Weingartner contrasted essentially 'doctrinal' and essentially 'dramatic' Plato interpretation, and, like Sinaiko and Plochmann a few years earlier, attempted a 'philosophic-dramatic unification.'³²

One could sum it up by saying that the question had changed, from something like

- (1) What were Plato's doctrines and how did they develop, as revealed by analyzing the arguments alone in the dialogues taken to be essentially treatises?

to something like

- (2) Should we take literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues into consideration in trying to understand Plato's thought?

Criticism has continued to grow about each of the six main aspects above. Earlier in the century it seemed to both Whitehead and Dewey that Plato was not the systematic dogmatist of traditional interpretation.³³ Doubts have increased about the idea that the dialogues contain Plato's doctrines and system as scholars have come to appreciate the significance of Plato's anonymity,³⁴ of his frequent ambiguity,³⁵ and the seeming conjunction between the critique of writing in the *Phaedrus* (274–276) and the denial in the *Seventh Letter* (342c–d) that Plato has ever, will ever, or could put the most important philosophical ideas into writing.³⁶

The developmental hypothesis has been seriously undermined by Thesleff's critique of stylometry and his arguments that many dialogues were revised, thus both creating a category of 'semi-authentic' dialogues and refuting an assumption

essential to the entire enterprise.³⁷ Thesleff's views are now followed by an increasing number of scholars impressed by the circularity of much argument in favor of developmental schemas, the lack of agreement on a chronological order among those most committed to developmentalism, questionable statistical analyses on the part of stylometrists, and an increasing suspicion that knowing the order of composition just is not the kind of information we need to understand the dialogues as philosophical documents.³⁸ Moreover, it has come to be realized that the supposedly 'inconclusive' or 'aporetic' dialogues need not, for that reason, be considered philosophically deficient.³⁹

The purely and simply didactic function of the dialogues has been called into question by claims that at least some of them may have been intended as dialectical exercises,⁴⁰ as philosophic training,⁴¹ as advertising for the Academy,⁴² irony,⁴³ or political satire.⁴⁴

With respect to the arguments of Socrates and Plato's other seeming mouthpieces, the assumption that they are Plato's has been called into question by Platonic anonymity,⁴⁵ the lack of theoretical justification for taking now Socrates, now someone else to be Plato's mouthpiece,⁴⁶ and by showing that it is in general fallacious to take the argument of characters to be those of their author.⁴⁷ It has been shown, on the other hand, that many fallacious arguments in the dialogues, rather than being weaknesses for which Plato ought to be censured, were deliberately used by him to achieve other ends.⁴⁸

The belief that the dialogues are to be understood as straightforward and serious attempts at communicating philosophic doctrine has been challenged by emphasis on the critique of writing in the *Phaedrus*⁴⁹ as well as by an increasing appreciation of the prevalence and implications of humor,⁵⁰ irony,⁵¹ and play throughout the corpus.⁵² Similarly, in contrast with the earlier view of Plato as dogmatically opposed to rhetoric, recent scholars have found that important use is made of rhetoric in the dialogues.⁵³

In line with much of the preceding, the older assumption that the dialogues are or can be interpreted essentially as treatises has been widely criticized on the grounds that it is *prima facie* false,⁵⁴ and more specifically that it creates unnecessary interpretive problems, commits the intentionalist fallacy,⁵⁵ impoverishes interpretations,⁵⁶ and renders Plato's pervasive influence unintelligible.⁵⁷ In addition, the dialogues exhibit structures characteristic of expressive forms very different from treatises;⁵⁸ in particular, they have been richly interpreted as dramas.⁵⁹ Moreover, interpreting the dialogues as if they were treatises written to be read conflicts with recent research about the transition from an oral to a literate culture⁶⁰ and about performative aspects of the dialogues as we have them.⁶¹

Finally, scholars are beginning to look at the process by which the traditional mode of interpretation developed and thus to see it as a product of particular circumstances, responsive to particular needs and preferences that may not be the same as our own. Tigerstedt has shown synoptically that Plato studies were dominated by a Neoplatonic dogmatism for much of the last two thousand years,⁶² and others have argued that the dogmatic interpretation of the dialogues can be traced back to his immediate successors in the Academy.⁶³ This may, in turn, relate to a wide-scale reevaluation of the traditional account of the history of ancient philosophy that has been developing since Cherniss undermined the Aristotelian story that is its foundation.⁶⁴ Attempts to construct an alternative have been made by Havelock, Capizzi, and Mansfeld.⁶⁵

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION NOW

Thus the mid-century consensus about a dogmatic, developmental, and non-literary or non-dramatic interpretation of Plato has come under increasing attack in the latter half of the century. The other side of the criticisms discussed above is constructive alternative approaches to the interpretation of the dialogues. A number of edited collections attempt a confrontation between traditional and non-traditional orientations and approaches.⁶⁶ Several more or less influential 'schools' of interpretation different from the mid-century consensus have also evolved.

The so-called Tübingen school, particularly associated with Hans Joachim Krämer and Konrad Gaiser, takes the view that consistent with the "philosophical passage" of the *Seventh Letter* and the critique of writing in *Phaedrus*, Plato's true doctrines are not (or not directly, openly) expressed in the dialogues. His true beliefs are, rather, the 'unwritten doctrine' occasionally referred to by Aristotle which can be reconstructed from the secondary tradition. The dialogues serve other functions, perhaps as protreptics, to attract students to the philosophical life, or shield the truth from the uninitiated.⁶⁷ The 'school' has found a powerful exponent in Thomas Szlezák,⁶⁸ and has gained strong support in Italy⁶⁹ and some influence in France and the U.S.⁷⁰ On the other hand, it has been the subject of sharp criticism by some of the foremost Plato scholars of the century for its devaluation of the dialogues, overemphasis on a small number of passages in the secondary tradition, substituting a metaphysical dogma for the ethical and political emphasis of the dialogues, misinterpreting the *Seventh Letter*, and arbitrarily declaring one passage in one dialogue decisive for interpreting all the rest of them.⁷¹

More influential in the United States has been the influence of Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein⁷² with its center at the

University of Chicago. Straussians emphasize taking the dialogue form seriously and interpret that via the 'logographic necessity' of *Phaedrus* 264, so that every smallest detail is assumed to have meaning, while the dialogues themselves are taken to be imitations (Klein's 'ethological mimes') rather than assertions of philosophical doctrine. Among those whose work reflects their influence are Stanley Rosen, Kenneth Dorter, Alan Bloom, David Roochnik, Drew Hyland, Charles Griswold, Ronna Burger, and Jacob Howland.⁷³ *Interpretation* is the Straussians' journal. Their position has been criticized as dogmatic, overly serious, ahistorical, arbitrary, and, like the analytical philosophers whom they often oppose, guilty of the mouthpiece fallacy.⁷⁴

A third 'school' of Plato interpretation that has had some influence in the U.S. was begun by Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and carried on by John Herman Randall, Jr. at Columbia University.⁷⁵ Like the Straussians, Woodbridge, Randall, and their followers, are not interested in the compositional order of the dialogues. The dialogues are interpreted as 'philosophical dramas' treating various 'themes' and offering a 'vision,' rather than a doctrine. The Woodbridge orientation is reflected in the work of Eckstein, Edman, and Tejera, among others.⁷⁶ Its point of view has been criticized as being 'skeptical' or turning Plato into a mere writer.⁷⁷

There is, of course, still plenty of work being done on Plato more or less in accordance with the mid-century consensus.⁷⁸ But one can hear that the tide has turned when T. M. Robinson writes, discussing changes in his thinking between the first and the second edition of his *Plato's Psychology*,

I would [now] be less inclined to talk about Platonic "doctrine" on such and such an issue at such and such a time in his writing life and more inclined to talk rather of explorations. The shift of terminology may be thought slight, but it is still, I think, significant in that it allows for the influence of the dialogue-form in Plato's writings in a way that my original work only glancingly averted to.⁷⁹

A similar change in tone and substance will be found between Terry Irwin's *Plato's Moral Theory* (1977) and his *Plato's Ethics* (1995).⁸⁰

In short, the state of the question about Plato has changed. The question is no longer *whether* to take literary and dramatic aspects into consideration, but *how*. With respect to the question about doctrine, the question is no longer just what Plato's doctrines are. The belief is spreading that for Plato 'philosophy' consists of something other than doctrines or dogmas; the question is, *what?*

The developmental view of Plato is no longer an assumption; rather, now it is a hypothesis in need of defense. And the

state of the question about the order of the dialogues is, Which order will give us useful insights into the dialogues and Plato's thought? Some interpreters proceed in a deliberate non-order⁸¹ while others experiment with the dramatic order⁸² and others use the dramatic order to support a doctrinal interpretation.⁸³

It is no longer reasonable to assume that the sole or primary function of the dialogues was didactic; the question now is, What is the set of functions that can be attributed to the corpus? And why should various ones be attributed to individual dialogues? The question about the arguments is not simply whether they are valid or invalid, but why does Plato make *this* character present *this* argument—valid or invalid, clear or ambiguous—in *these* dialogical circumstances? Similarly, it has become clear that there is no simple opposition between seriousness and play when it comes to understanding Plato. The questions about Plato's mood or tone now are, How serious is a particular playful, humorous, or ironic passage? How playful, humorous, or ironic might apparently serious passages be? And how are we to balance the two in interpreting whole dialogues?

Finally, and in sum, it is no longer reasonable to interpret the dialogues as if they were treatises. Some passages and some dialogues seem more treatise-like than others, but at least as often they seem like comedy, tragedy, myth, or rhetoric. The state of the question now is, What kind of texts are these dialogues? What are their aims and functions? How do they work? How should we go about interpreting them?

QUESTIONS FOR THE RESEARCH AGENDA

Thus, there needs to be a new research agenda for Plato studies in the coming years. Given the growing consensus that Plato is not (directly, primarily) teaching doctrines in the dialogues, for example, we need to investigate what kind of 'philosophic meaning' the dialogues might have *other* than dogmatic or doctrinal?⁸⁴ This will inevitably involve reconsideration of the simple opposition between dogmatism and skepticism both in the history of Plato interpretation and in the history of philosophy more generally.⁸⁵

As for the order of the dialogues, the questions to be pursued now have to do with the variety of possible orders and their utilities. Can we determine a comprehensive dramatic order?⁸⁶ If so, what sort of insight does this provide into Plato's thought? Alternatively, as some ancient Platonists thought, perhaps there is an appropriate order for reading and teaching the dialogues that is neither chronological nor dramatic.⁸⁷ It would seem necessary to pursue the questions of revision and semi-authenticity that Thesleff has raised not only

for those who remain interested in the order of composition, but also for those who remain determined to discover Plato's doctrines in the dialogues.⁸⁸ For if the dialogues were revised by others, if dialogues in the familiar canon are only semi-authentic,⁸⁹ then we may be left with a 'school doctrine' rather than something that can be thought to be Plato's own.

The question, to repeat, is no longer *whether* literary and dramatic matters are important for understanding the dialogues, but *how*. Above all, therefore, research needs to focus on these. While there was widespread agreement about the kinds of 'doctrine' and 'development' and 'arguments' in which traditional interpretation has been interested, there is unfortunately little agreement among the many non-traditional individuals and schools of interpretation about the meaning of the terms that are crucial to us.

What exactly are the literary characteristics of the dialogues? What exactly are their dramatic characteristics? And how do they function in the creation of meanings *other* than the doctrinal meanings traditionally sought? For example, Plato's style has been studied for the most part only as part of stylometry, not in order to learn something directly about his thought.⁹⁰ Similarly, systematic study of word-choice, syntax, idiom, and dialect may have something to tell us about Plato's thought as it is expressed in the dialogues, not just about his literary art. Perhaps the mostly broadly shared conviction among the non-traditional Plato interpreters whose work has been discussed here is that with Plato thought and art, philosophy and literature, ideas and their expression, form and content are not to be distinguished from each other, but rather are marked in their interpenetration.⁹¹

Thus, moving from literary to dramatic aspects of the dialogues,⁹² sound work has been done on particular characters and the function of character in the dialogues.⁹³ There is certainly room for more individual character studies, and especially for a work bringing together all the more than seventy characters who appear in one or more dialogues, assessing their character, age, family, status, and ideas in the dialogues and comparing that with prosopographical and other historical information about such an individual, along with the meaning of their names and the possible relevance of them to the dialogues in which they participate.

Similarly, various scholars have paid attention to settings,⁹⁴ myths told,⁹⁵ traditional stories re-enacted,⁹⁶ quotations,⁹⁷ allusions to legends, poetry, and historical persons, places, and events,⁹⁸ jokes, puns, and word-play.⁹⁹ Systematic and comprehensive studies of these features of the dialogues as contributing to their meaning and to Plato's thought as expressed in them would be extremely valuable. A great deal of work has already been done on irony, but in some ways we are still at

the beginning of understanding the full range of kinds and the different sorts of impact they should have on our interpretations.¹⁰⁰

Obviously, then, the dialogues are no longer taken to be the *kinds* of texts they were widely believed to be at mid-century. There is need for a broader inquiry into the nature, presentation, and audience of the texts based on historical knowledge. Powerful cases have been made that the dialogues serve a variety of functions other than the straightforwardly didactic one of communicating philosophic doctrine. It has been proposed that they are morally and politically paideutic, in the broad, ancient sense, and thus are competitive with the works of poets and playwrights; that they intended to turn people to the pursuit of philosophy or to enrollment in the Academy; that they are samples of dialectical practice for study and imitation; that they attempt to establish a new form of high-cultural activity, philosophy, and a new culture-hero, the philosopher; that they are a form of amusement or entertainment. These different functions need to be studied closely, critically, and comparatively on the hypothesis that every dialogue is likely to serve more than one.

Similarly, in line with research mentioned above, more and closer work needs to be done on the facts about and the inferences to be drawn from revisions of the texts, the creation, availability, and transmission of the *Corpus Platonicum*, the activities that took place in the Academy, dramatic or oral presentation, and the audience, whether hearing or reading, of those dialogues. It may be true, as recent research has suggested, that the texts were revised both by Plato during his lifetime and by others afterwards, that while some were exoteric, written for a broader public, many were esoteric, for the narrow circle of the Academy, that they were to be read aloud and even performed (acted?) before a group rather than read silently by oneself, that the exoteric had a culturally paideutic function and competed, both in that respect and as POIESIS, with the works of poets and orators, and that the esoteric were examples of philosophical discussion and reminders of actual discussion, meant to have a live, oral commentary.¹⁰¹

If this is true, then what Plato can have intended to accomplish is something rather different from what later philosophers have intended to accomplish by writing their texts. And, if so, then rather different modes of analysis and canons of assessment—that combine what has traditionally been thought of as philosophical with literary and dramatic¹⁰²—will be appropriate. We will need to think about kinds of knowledge other than the propositional forms more familiar to modern philosophers.¹⁰³ We will need to assess arguments less in terms of their validity according to modern standards, including the notion that an *ad hominem* argument is always a fal-

lacy. We will also need to suspend our rationalistic belief in the contradiction between seriousness and play and consider the notion, familiar enough to readers of fiction, that seriousness and play are sometimes inextricably intertwined.¹⁰⁴

Two recent monographs seem to pursue the agenda suggested here and therefore deserve special mention. De Strycker and Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*,¹⁰⁵ subtitled "A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary," will reward serious study by Plato scholars. The volume is thorough in its scholarship, attentive to historical context, and grounded in a careful literary and dramatic analysis of the dialogue in accordance with ancient rhetorical principles and practices. It provides the most thorough example known to me of raising and attempting to answer important questions about the overall structure of the dialogue and the functions of its constituent parts.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, the authors presuppose a questionable Platonic chronology, are essentially dogmatic in their interpretation, and vitiate their own sensitivity to literary structure by inferring from what characters say to Plato's intentions and theses.

Rutherford, *The Art of Plato*¹⁰⁷ is much more ambitious in its way, discussing at some length *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*, and giving shorter analyses of eight other dialogues. Rutherford is also thorough in his scholarship, and, unlike de Strycker and Slings, aware that the usual chronology will not do (2–7) and that the dialogues are not to be interpreted simply as assertions of Plato's own ideas (15). He describes his project as "an attempt to advance the literary understanding of a philosophic writer" (ix); and it does, indeed, provide a wealth of literary and dramatic observation that will be useful to general readers. Specialists, however, will probably judge that, on the whole, Rutherford has come down pretty squarely on the literary as opposed to the philosophic side, that what is missing is a genuine synthesis of the two in which the literary illuminates the philosophic enabling us to understand philosophic arguments, methods, and ideas in ways that solve persistent interpretive problems of the sorts indicated in earlier pages.

Finally, much more and more detailed research is needed into the history—especially the ancient history—of Plato interpretation as distinct from Platonism. We have begun understand that history, to see how it has been determined not only by the texts, by also the intellectual commitments of the interpreters and the social, political, and religious circumstances of their times and places; and we have begun to see the ways in which that history has determined the interpretive orientations and commitments of our own century.¹⁰⁸

This research agenda—and it is, of course, only part of the full agenda—may seem dauntingly large. But it offers the

promise of better understanding Plato's dialogues and Plato's thought on their own terms and in their own contexts. In any case, it carries on a dialogue with Plato in which successive generations have engaged from his day to our own.¹⁰⁹

NOTES

¹ The early beginnings by Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Platonic Scholarship: 1945–1955," *Classical World* (1957), 173–82, 185–96, 197–201, 209–11; and E. M. Manasse, "Bücher über Platon. I. Werke in deutscher Sprache," *Philosophische Rundschau* Sonderheft 1 (1957), "II. Werke in englischer Sprache," *Philosophische Rundschau* Sonderheft 2 (1961), and "III. Werke in französischer Sprache," *Philosophische Rundschau* Sonderheft 7 (1976) were vastly extended by Harold Cherniss, "Plato: 1950–1957," *Lustrum* 4 (1959), 5–308 and *Lustrum* 5 (1960), 321–648. At least as far as comprehensiveness, Cherniss' task has been continued by Richard D. McKirahan, *Plato and Socrates. A Comprehensive Bibliography (1958–1973)* (New York: Garland, 1978) and in a specifically Platonic direction by Luc Brisson, "Platon: 1958–1975," *Lustrum* 20 (1977), 5–304; L. Brisson and H. Ioannidi, "Platon: 1975–1980," *Lustrum* 25 (1983), 11–294; and Brisson and Ioannidi, "Platon: 1980–1985," *Lustrum* 30 (1988), 11–285. Finally now *L'année philologique* is due to join *Philosopher's Index* as a database that can be searched electronically.

² Basque, Bulgarian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, modern Greek, Hebrew, Japanese, Latin, Norwegian, Russian, Serbian, and Swedish, to name a few.

³ Holger Thesleff, "Looking for Clues: An Interpretation of Some Literary Aspects of Plato's 'Two-Level Model'," in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Gerald A. Press (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), 17.

⁴ Rudolph H. Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: The Cratylus, the Protagoras, the Parmenides* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 3. The point was already made by W. K. C. Guthrie, *Twentieth Century Approaches to Plato*. Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, Ser. 1. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967], 1–18). It also arises from Enrico Berti's "strategies of appropriation" ("Strategie di interpretazione dei filosofi antichi: Platone e Aristotele," *Elenchos* 10 [1989], 289–315) and recurs in Diskin Clay's distinction between "Platonic Studies and the Study of Plato," *Arion* n.s. 2 (1975), 116–32.

⁵ Guthrie, *Twentieth Century Approaches to Plato*, 18.

⁶ James Hankins' distinction between "that broader and more diffuse stream of Platonic philosophy ... [and] the study and interpretation of Plato's own works," ("Plato in the Middle Ages," in *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph R. Strayer [New York: Scribner, 1987], vol. 9, 696) echoes Brumbaugh's description of Whitehead as "the great modern Platonist (as opposed to Plato scholar)" (*Plato for the Modern Age* [New York: Crowell-Collier, 1964], 5).

⁷ To answer briefly an objection that might be raised to this, my answers to the corrosive form of deconstructionism sometimes encountered are: (a) it is fine as a 'strategy of appropriation' for those for whom it is congenial; (b) if it is used to refute other approaches, it will refute itself; and (c) there *is*, after all, such a thing as evidence and argument and there *is* a difference between better and worse in these matters.

⁸ See Richard Lewis Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato* (London: Macmillan, 1964), 6–11.

⁹ See Gerald A. Press, "Plato's Dialogues as Enactments," in *The Third Way: A New Direction in Platonic Studies*, ed. Francisco Gonzalez (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 133–152. On anonymity, irony, humor, see notes 34, 44, and 100 infra.

¹⁰ L. G. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1962), Olympiodorus, *Commentary on the Alcibiades* (2.156–162; p. 6 Westerink) and *Anon. Prol.* (1.29–35; p. 5 Westerink). For analysis, see Alice Swift Riginos, *Platonica: The Anecdotes Concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 24–25.

¹¹ E. N. Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato* (Stockholm, 1977), 13ff. Werner Jaeger, ("Der Wandel des Platobildes im neunzehnten Jahrhundert," *Humanistische Reden* [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960], 129–42), on the other hand, saw in nineteenth century interpretations an opposition between quests for individual specificity and quests for eternal value which could be resolved in his own 'cultural' interpretation of Plato's philosophy as PAIDEIA.

¹² See Gerald A. Press, "The Dialogical Mode in Modern Plato Studies," in chapter 1 of *Plato's Dialogues: The Dialogical Mode*, eds. Victorino Tereja and Richard E. Hart (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, forthcoming). For an earlier analysis of 'doctrinal' Plato interpretation, see Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, 1–3. The question whether Plato was a dogmatist or a skeptic was already a matter of dispute in antiquity; Diogenes Laertius 3.51.

¹³ On skepticism in the Renaissance, see Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Descartes* (Assen: Vangorcum, 1960) and Charles Schmitt, *Cicero Scepticus: A study of the influence of the Academia in the Renaissance* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972).

¹⁴ F. E. D. Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, trans. William Dobson (London: Pitt, 1836; repr. New York: Arno, 1973), 14: in "the philosophy of Plato ... form and subject are inseparable, and no proposition is to be rightly understood, except in its own place, and with the combinations and limitations which Plato has assigned to it." On Schleiermacher's views and their impact, see E. N. Tigerstedt, *The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato* (Helsinki, 1974), 5–7.

¹⁵ The essay translated by Allan as "The Literary Form and Philosophical Content of the Platonic Dialogues," in Julius Stenzel, *Plato's Method of Dialectic*, trans. D. J. Allan (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 1–22, was originally given as a lecture in 1916 in which Stenzel argued that the developmental view of Plato was too simple and that "philosophical' interpreters, if they ignore literary form, ... cannot fulfill their special task of understanding what Plato's problems in themselves mean" (22).

¹⁶ René Schaerer, *La question platonicienne. Étude sur les rapports de la pensée et de l'expression dans les dialogues* (Neuchâtel, 1938; 2nd, expanded ed., Paris: Vrin, 1969).

¹⁷ Paul Friedländer, *Platon* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928–30; 2nd ed. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1954–57; 3rd ed., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1964–75). *Plato*. Trans. Hans Meyerhoff. Vol. I: *An Introduction* (New York: Pantheon, 1958; 2nd ed. 1969). Vol. II: *The Dialogues, First Period* (1964). Vol. III: *The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods* (1969).

¹⁸ Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, *The Son of Apollo* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1929; repr. Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1988).

¹⁹ Luigi Stefanini, *Platone* (Padova: CEDAM, 1932–1935; 2nd ed., Padova: CEDAM, 1949). My translation of chapters 1–4 is presently under consideration.

²⁰ E.g., Paul Natorp, *Platons Ideenlehre* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1903), Léon Robin, *La théorie platonicienne de l'Amour* (Paris, 1908), J. A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (Oxford, 1909), I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London: Routledge, 1962), W. J. Verdenius, *MIMESIS: Plato's Doctrine of Imitation* (Leiden: Brill, 1972); and J. N. Findlay, *The Written and the Unwritten Doctrines* (New York: Humanities Press, 1974).

²¹ On Zeller and his influence, see Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato*, 15–17.

²² Paul Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago: Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, 1903) and *What Plato Said* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933). John Burnet (*Platonism* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928]) and A. E. Taylor (*Plato: The Man and His Work* [London: 1926]) are also sometimes considered Platonic unitarians. Harold Cherniss, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas," *American Journal of Philology* 57 (1936), 445–56, is a small classic of unitarian thinking and has been reprinted several times. For a critique of it from a non-doctrinal point of view, see Kenneth Sayre, "Why Plato Never Had a Theory of Forms," *Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy* 9 (1993), 167–99. For a critique of the unitarian position in general from the doctrinal point of view, see Renford Bambrough, "The Disunity of Plato's Thought," *Philosophy* 47 (1972), 295–307.

²³ First propounded by Karl Friedrich Hermann, *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1839; repr. New York: Arno, 1976). A much-read reference work was Hans Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1905). On the development of the developmental approach, see Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato*, 25–51.

²⁴ E.g., Julius Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik* (Breslau, 1917; repr. 2nd ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1961); Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); E. W. Schipper, *Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965); J. E. Raven, *Plato's Thought in the Making: A Study of the Development of his Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1967); J. Gould, *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1972); W. J. Prior, *Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1985); and George Klosko, *The Development of Plato's Political Theory* (New York: Methuen, 1986).

²⁵ The earliest studies of stylometry were Lewis Campbell, *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* (Oxford, 1867) and W. Dittenberger, "Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie des platonischen Dialoge," *Hermes* 16 (1881), 3212–45. W. Lutoslawski, *The origin and growth of Plato's logic, with an Account of Plato's Style and of the Chronology of his Writings* (London: Longmans, Green, 1897) includes a history of the subject up to that time and was enormously influential. More than one

hundred thirty chronologies proposed from 1792 to 1981 are examined by Holger Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1982).

²⁶ Richard Robinson, "Plato's Consciousness of Fallacy," *Mind* 51 (1942), 97–114, argued that Plato simply wasn't aware of the many fallacies he committed. Peter Geach, "Plato's *Euthyphro*: An Analysis and Commentary," *Monist* 50 (1960), 369–82, precipitated an extended discussion in the journals of whether or not Plato was guilty of what Geach termed the 'Socratic fallacy.' Similarly, David Sachs' article, "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*," *Philosophical Review* 72 (1963), 141–58, generated a sizeable literature.

²⁷ E.g., George Grote, *Plato and the other companions of Sokrates* (London: J. Murray, 1865–1867), 2.155, n. 2 on *Charm* 161c: "This is the dramatic art of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon him as a philosopher ..."

²⁸ Julia Annas: "After all, Plato does put forward his views in the mouth of Socrates." (*An Introduction to Plato's Republic* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], 9).

²⁹ Noted by Berel Lang, "Presentation and Representation in Plato's Dialogues," *Philosophical Forum* 4 (1973), 224–40.

³⁰ Brumbaugh, *Plato for the Modern Age*, 5–6. Similarly Yvon Lafrance set up an opposition between "la lecture continental" and "la méthode analytique." ("Autour de Platon: continentaux et analystes," *Diotima* 3 [1979], 17–37).

³¹ Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Symposium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 11. Rosen draws the contrast more clearly at the outset of his later *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983): "Plato's *Sophist*, like any of his dialogues may be approached from two more or less contrasting perspectives ... the ontological and the dramatic" (1). Similarly, Noel B. Reynolds, *Interpreting Plato's Euthyphro and Meno* (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University, 1988), esp. ch. 1, "A Defense of the Literary Approach."

³² Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, 1–14; Herman L. Sinaiko, *Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); George Kimball Plochmann, "Supporting Themes in the Symposium," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, eds. John P. Anton and George Kustas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), 328–44. For other attempts to 'unify' the philosophic and literary, see Ronald Hathaway, "Explaining the Unity of the Platonic Dialogue," *Philosophy and Literature* 8 (1984), 195–208; Arthur Krentz, "Dramatic Form and Philosophic Content," *Philosophy and Literature* 7 (1983), 32–47; and Albert Levi, "Philosophy as Literature: The Dialogue," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 9 (1976), 1–20.

³³ A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, ed. Griffin and Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), 39, refers to "the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings." Similarly John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in *John Dewey. The Later Works: 1925–1953*. Vol. 5 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 154–155 states: "I am unable to find in him that all-comprehensive and overriding system which later interpretation has, as it seems to me, conferred upon him as a dubious boon."

³⁴ See Phillip Merlan, "Form and Content in Plato's Philosophy,"

Journal of the History of Ideas 8 (1947), 406–30; Ludwig Edelstein, “Platonic Anonymity,” *American Journal of Philology* 83 (1962), 1–22; Paul Plass, “Philosophic Anonymity and Irony in the Platonic Dialogues,” *American Journal of Philology* 85 (1964), 254–78; and L. A. Kosman, “Silence and Imitation in the Platonic Dialogues,” in *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, eds. James Klagge and Nicholas Smith (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* [suppl.] 1992), 73–92; Diogenes Laertius 3.37 indicates that ancient critics already noticed Plato’s absence from the dialogues.

³⁵ To take a particular case, W. K. C. Guthrie (*A History of Greek Philosophy*, 6 volumes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969], vol. 4, 195–99), Rosamond Kent Sprague (*Plato’s Use of Fallacy* [London: Routledge, 1962], Ch. 4), James H. Leshner (“GNOSIS and EPISTEME in Socrates’ Dream in the *Theaetetus*,” *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 89 [1969], 72–78), and James J. Mulhern (“TROPOS and POLYTROPIA in Plato’s *Hippias Minor*,” *Phoenix* 22 [1968], 238–88) all find ambiguities in the argumentation of the *Hippias Minor*. Nevertheless both Rosalind Weiss (“HO AGATHOS as HO DUNATOS in the *Hippias Minor*,” *Classical Quarterly* 31 [1981], 187–204) and Jane S. Zembaty (“Socrates’ Perplexity in Plato’s *Hippias Minor*,” in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy III: Plato*, eds. John P. Anton and Anthony Preus [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989]) deny that there are any equivocations or ambiguities. Richard A. McNeal (*Law and Rhetoric in the Crito* [Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1992]) argues that contrary to the preferences of contemporary analytical philosophers but in line with both the habits of poets and the traits of the oral culture from which he grew, Plato regularly uses language with density, polyvalence, or polysemy. Ancient critics also noticed the ambiguity of the dialogues; cf. Diogenes Laertius 3.63–65, who attributes it to Plato’s wish to keep his beliefs from the ignorant. Cf. Livio Rossetti, “Where Philosophy and Literature Merge in the Platonic Dialogues,” *Argumentation* 6 (1993), 433–43.

³⁶ The most widely-influential—and widely criticized—version of this is the “Tübingen” view that Plato’s true doctrines were ‘unwritten.’ See, e.g., Konrad Gaiser, *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1959) and H.-J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg: Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1959). For a non-Tübingen interpretation of this, see Sayre, “Why Plato Never Had a Theory of Forms,” 178–86. Harold Tarrant, *Thrasyllan Platonism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) argues that this “philosophical digression” is actually an interpolation by Thrasyllus, the first century CE astrologer to Tiberius to whom we also owe the tetralogical arrangement and the philosophical typology of the Corpus Platonicum as it has come down to us.

³⁷ Holger Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, and “Platonic Chronology,” *Phronesis* 34 (1989), 1–26.

³⁸ See Jacob Howland, “Re-reading Plato: The Problem of Platonic Chronology,” *Phoenix* 45 (1991), 189–214; James A. Arieti, *Interpreting Plato* (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991), 10–11; Debra Nails, “Platonic Chronology Reconsidered,” *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 3 (1992), 314–27; “Problems with Vlastos’ Platonic Developmentalism,” *Ancient Philosophy* 13 (1993), 273–91, and “Plato’s Middle Cluster,” *Phoenix* 48 (1994), 62–67; T. M. Robinson, “Plato and the Computer,” *Ancient Philosophy* 12 (1992), 375–82; McNeal, *Law and Rhetoric in the*

Crito, 46–57; Charles M. Young, “Review of Vlastos, *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*,” *Ethics* 103 (1993), 817–20, and “Plato and Computer Dating,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12 (1994), 227–50. Debra Nails, *Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 53–135, presents the evidence and its consequences especially thoroughly and clearly.

³⁹ E.g., James Haden, “On Plato’s Inconclusiveness,” *Classical Journal* 64 (1969), 219–24.

⁴⁰ R. E. Allen, *Plato’s Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms* (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

⁴¹ E.g., Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, 148, 152, and 162.

⁴² H.-J. Krämer, “Retraktionen zum Problem des esoterischen Platon,” *Museum Helveticum* 21 (1964), 137–67; “Die platonische Akademie und das Problem einer systematischen Interpretation der Philosophie Platons,” *Kant Studien* 55 (1964), 69–101; and Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*.

⁴³ E.g., Woodbridge, *The Son of Apollo*, 89; followed by John Herman Randall, Jr., *Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 171; and Drew Hyland, “Taking the Longer Road: The Irony of Plato’s *Republic*,” *Revue de la Métaphysique et de la Morale* 93 (1988), 317–35, who follows Leo Strauss, *The City and Man, What is Political Philosophy? and other studies* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 61, 116.

⁴⁴ While the *Republic* is traditionally considered Plato’s utopia and attacked as such, there is also a minority opinion that, on the contrary, it is satirical. The earliest to hold this view seems to have been Philip Melancthon, *Philipi Melanthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, vol. 11 (Halle, 1843), cols. 413–425, cited by Tigerstedt, *Neoplatonic Interpretation*, 33, n. 246; cf. Philip Melancthon, *A Melancthon Reader*, trans. Ralph Keen (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 76. More recently, see H. D. Rankin, “Laughter, Humour and Related Topics in Plato,” *Classica et Medievalia* 28 (1967), 211; and Victorino Tejera, *Plato’s Dialogues One by One* (New York: Irvington, 1984), 97.

⁴⁵ E.g., Rosen, *Plato’s Symposium*, xviii.

⁴⁶ See Tejera, *Plato’s Dialogues One by One*, 4–5 and Mary Whitlock Blundell, “Self-Censorship in Plato’s *Republic*,” in *Virtue, Love and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos*, eds. Terry Irwin and M. C. Nussbaum (Edmonton: Academic Publishing, 1994), 35–36.

⁴⁷ J. J. Mulhern, “Two Interpretive Fallacies,” *Systematics* 9 (1971), 168–72; distinguishes the ‘Plato-says Fallacy’ and the ‘Plato’s Mouthpiece Fallacy’; nicely applied to interpretation of the anti-poetic vein in *Republic* by Blundell, “Self-Censorship in Plato’s *Republic*,” 35–36.

⁴⁸ Sprague, *Plato’s Use of Fallacy*, is fundamental. See also Maurice Cohen, “The Aporias in Plato’s Early Dialogues,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 23 (1962), 163–74; George Klosko, “Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 61 (1979), 125–42 and “Plato and the Morality of Fallacy,” *American Journal of Philology* 108 (1987), 612–26.

⁴⁹ This is especially characteristic of the Straussians in the U.S. and of the Tübingen scholars in Europe. See notes 36 *supra* and 68–70 *infra*.

⁵⁰ Dorothy Tarrant, “Colloquialisms, Semi-Proverbs, and Word-Play in Plato,” *Classical Quarterly* 40 (1946), 109–15, and “More Colloquialisms, Semi-Proverbs, and Word-Play in Plato,” *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 8 (1958), 158–60; Rankin, “Laughter, Humour and Related Topics in

Plato," and Rosamond Kent Sprague, "Platonic Jokes and Philosophical Points," in *Laughter Down the Centuries*, vol. 1 eds. Jakel and Timonen (Turku, 1995), 53–58.

⁵¹ The literature on irony in Plato's dialogues has become quite large. See, e.g., W. Buechner, "Ueber den Begriff der Eironeia," *Hermes* 76 (1941), 339–58; René Schaerer, "Le mecanisme de l'ironie dans ses rapports avec la dialectique," *Revue de la Metaphysique et de la Morale* 48 (1941); Friedländer, *An Introduction*, vol. 1, ch. 7; Plass, "Philosophic Anonymity and Irony in the Platonic Dialogues" *American Journal of Philology* 85 (1964), 254–78; E. L. Burge, "The Irony of Socrates," *Antichthon* 3 (1969), 6ff.; W. Boder, *Die sokratische Ironie in den platonischen Früdialogen* (Amsterdam: Grüner, 1973); and Gregory Vlastos, "Socratic Irony," *Classical Quarterly* 37 (1987), 80ff.

⁵² Gavin Ardley, "The Role of Play in the Philosophy of Plato," *Philosophy* 42 (1967), 226–44; Paul Plass, "Play' and Philosophic Detachment in Plato," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 98 (1967), 343–64; G. J. de Vries, *Zum Spel bij Plato* (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1949), unfortunately published only in Dutch with English and French résumés; Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 4.56–66 sums up well.

⁵³ E.g., Guy Bouchand, "L'Antimodèle Platonicien de la Nouvelle Rhétorique," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 16 (1981), 693–712; Jane Curran, "The Rhetorical Technique of Plato's *Phaedrus*," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986), 66–72; Thomas Lewis, "Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the *Gorgias*," *Interpretation* 14 (1986), 195–210; Jay Farness, "Missing Socrates: Socratic Rhetoric in a Platonic Text," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987), 41–59; James Murray, "Plato on Knowledge, Persuasion, and the Art of Rhetoric," *Ancient Philosophy* 8 (1988), 1–10; Livio Rossetti, "Sulla dimensione retorica del dialogare socratico," *Methexis* 3 (1990), 15–32; McNeal, *Law and Rhetoric*. A. T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) argues that Plato actually invented of rhetoric as a discrete discipline.

⁵⁴ Sinaiko, *Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato*, 4–7; Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, 1–3; Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, 2.

⁵⁵ Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, 5–6.

⁵⁶ Rosen, *Plato's Symposium*, xii; and Mitchell Miller, Jr., *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 3–4.

⁵⁷ Charles L. Griswold, ed., *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 1.

⁵⁸ E.g., chiasmic structure: Roland Garrett, "The Structure of Plato's *Euthyphro*," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 12 (1974), 165–83; mimetic structures: Jacob Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's Meno* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); paideutic structures: Mitchell Miller, Jr., *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980) and *Plato's Parmenides*, 1984; pedimental structures: Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, "Platonic Chronology," and "Looking for Clues." See also Herman Gundert, *Der platonische Dialog* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1968) and Victor Goldschmidt, *Les dialogues de Platon: Structure et méthode dialectique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).

⁵⁹ Interesting chapters on Plato will be found in Philip A. Coggin,

The Uses of Drama (New York: Braziller, 1956); D. D. Raphael, *The Paradox of Tragedy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960); H. D. F. Kitto, *POIESIS: Structure and Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and David Daiches, *Critical Approaches to Literature*, 2nd. ed. (London: Longmans, 1981). On the development of more specifically Platonic drama, see Michael W. Haslam, "Plato, Sophron, and the Dramatic Dialogue," *Bulletin of the Institute for Classical Studies* 19 (1972); and now R. B. Rutherford, *The Art of Plato* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 10–15.

⁶⁰ The initial articulation of this hypothesis as regards Plato was made by Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). See now Kevin Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Joanne Waugh, "Neither Published Nor Perished: The Dialogues as Speech, Not Text," in *The Third Way: A New Direction in Platonic Studies*, ed. Francisco Gonzalez (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). For an extended critique of Havelock, see Nails, *Agora, Academy, and the Conduct of Philosophy*, 139–191.

⁶¹ Gilbert Ryle, *Plato's Progress* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 21–32, concludes that "Plato normally composed his dialogues for oral delivery to audiences" (32). Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, presents the dialogues as wholly dramas. Cf. John Gould, "Plato and Performance," in *The Language of the Cave*, ed. Andrew Barker and Martin Warner (*Apeiron* 25 [1992], 13–25).

⁶² Tigerstedt, *Neoplatonic Interpretation*.

⁶³ E.g., Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, 5–6 and "The Hellenistic Obliteration of Plato's Dialogism," in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Gerald A. Press (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 129–44; Gerald A. Press, "Continuities and Innovations in the History of Republic Interpretation," *International Studies in Philosophy* 28 (1996) and "The Dialogical Mode in Modern Plato Studies."

⁶⁴ Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935) and *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1944).

⁶⁵ Havelock, *Preface to Plato*; Antonio Cappizzi, *La Repubblica Cosmica: Appunti per una storia non peripatetica della nascita della filosofia in Grecia* (Roma: Ateneo, 1982) = *The Cosmic Republic: Notes for a Non-Peripatetic History of the Birth of Philosophy in Greece* (Amsterdam: Gieben, 1991); Jaap Mansfeld, *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990) and *Heresiography in Context* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), esp. Ch. 1, "Diels' Error." In a recent review of Goeransson, "Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus," Brad Inwood states that "a revolution in our understanding of the surviving sources is under way" (*Bryn Mawr Classical Review* 12 [1995], 8).

⁶⁶ Griswold, *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings*; Klage and Smith, *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*; Barker and Warner, *Language of the Cave*; Press, *Plato's Dialogues*; Gonzalez, *The Third Way*; and Tejera and Hart, forthcoming.

⁶⁷ The founding works are those mentioned in note 36 *supra*. For the debate generated early on, see J. Wipperfurth, ed. *Das Problem der ungeschriebene Lehre* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972). For a recent summary of the position, see W. Kullmann, "Platons

Schriftkritik," *Hermes* 119 (1991), 1–21.

⁶⁸ Thomas Szlezák, *Platon und die Schriflichkeit der Philosophie* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1985) and *Platon lesen* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991) = *Come leggere Platone* (Milano: Rusconi, 1993). Also to be noted on the Tübingen lines is the work of Rafael Ferber (e.g., "Warum hat Plato die 'ungeschriebene Lehre' nicht geschrieben?" *Symposium Platonicum* 2 [1992], 138–55, and "Hat Plato in der 'ungeschriebene Lehre' eine 'dogmatische Metaphysik und Systematik' vertreten?" *Methexis* 6 [1993], 37–54) and Michael Erler ("Anagnorisis in Tragödie und Philosophie. Eine Anmerkung zu Platons Dialog *Politikos*," *Würzburger Jahrbücher für Altertumswissenschaft N. F.* 18 [1992], 147–70).

⁶⁹ E.g., Giovanni Reale, *Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone: Rilettura della metafisica dei grandi dialoghi alla luce delle "Dottrine non scritte"* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1987) and Domenico Pesce, *Il Platone di Tubinga* (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1990). Reale, at the Catholic University of Milan, has been extremely active in spreading the Tübingen view in Italy, among other things by publishing translations of various works by Gaiser, Krämer, Szlezák, and Erler. For the details, see Enrico Berti, "Strategie di interpretazione dei filosofi antichi," *Elenchos* 10 (1989), 289–315.

⁷⁰ Marie-Dominique Richard, *L'enseignement oral de Platon. Une nouvelle interpretation du platonisme* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1986); H.-J. Krämer, *Plato and the Foundation of Metaphysics*, trans. J. R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), unfortunately an extremely poor translation.

⁷¹ Kurt von Fritz, "Zur Frage der 'esoterischen' Philosophie Platons," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 49 (1967), 255–68, and "The Philosophical Passage in the *Seventh Letter* and the Problem of Plato's 'Esoteric Philosophy'," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, eds. John P. Anton and George Kustas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), 408–47; Gregory Vlastos, "On Plato's Oral Doctrine: Review of Krämer's *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles*," *Gnomon* 41 (1963), 641–55, reprinted in Vlastos, *Platonic Studies*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 379–403; Margarita Isnardi-Parente, "Per l'interpretazione dell'exkursus filosofico della VII epistula Platonica," *Parola del Passato* 19 (1964), 241–90; Stanley Rosen, *Introduction to Plato's Symposium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Tigerstedt, *Neoplatonic Interpretation*, is intended as an extended refutation; Wolfgang Wieland, *Platon und die Formen des Wissens* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1982). Most recently: Sayre, "Why Plato Never Had a Theory of Forms," 182; Luc Brisson, "Présupposés et conséquences d'une interprétation ésotériste de Platon," *Méthexis* 6 (1993), 11–35; Franco Fronterotta, "Une énigme platonicienne: La question des doctrines non-écrites," *Les Études Anciennes* 11 (1993), 115–57.

⁷² Strauss, *The City and Man*, and Klein, *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*.

⁷³ Rosen, *Plato's Symposium* and *Plato's Sophist*; Kenneth Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) and *Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Alan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," in *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 307–436; David Roochnik, *The Tragedy*

of Reason: Toward a Platonic Conception of Logos (London: Routledge, 1990); Drew Hyland, *The Virtue of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Plato's Charmides* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981); Charles L. Griswold, Jr., *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Ronna Burger, *The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) and *Plato's Phaedrus* (Mobile: University of Alabama Press, 1988); and Jacob Howland, *The Republic: The Odyssey of Philosophy* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993).

⁷⁴ For a critique of Strauss and Bloom, see George Klosko, "The 'Straussian' Interpretation of Plato's *Republic*," *History of Political Theory* 7 (1986), 274–93. For a critique of Rosen's 'pan-ironism,' see Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato*, 95–96. Harry Berger, Jr., "Levels of Discourse in Plato's Dialogues," in *Literature and the Question of Philosophy*, ed. Anthony J. Cascardi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 75–100; Josiah Gould, "Klein on Ethological Mimes, for example the *Meno*," *Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969), 253–65; Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, 6; Victorino Tejera, "Strauss' Socrates: The Composite," *Skepsis* 3 (1992), 46–89. For an intra-Straussian polemic, see David Levine, "The Tyranny of Scholarship," *Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1984), 65–72. See also, Myles Burnyeat, "Sphinx Without a Secret," *New York Review of Books* 32 (May 30, 1985), 30–36.

⁷⁵ Woodbridge, *The Son of Apollo*, and Randall, *Plato: Dramatist of the Life of Reason*.

⁷⁶ Irwin Edman, "The Dialogues as Philosophical Drama," xiii–xlvii in *The Works of Plato* (New York: Tudor Press, 1931); Jerome Eckstein, *The Platonic Method: An interpretation of the Dramatic-Philosophic Aspects of the Meno* (New York: Greenwood, 1968) and *The Deathday of Socrates: Living, Dying and Immortality—The Theater of Ideas in Plato's Phaedo* (Frenchtown, NJ: Columbia Publishing, 1981); Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, and Tejera and Hart, *Plato's Dialogues*.

⁷⁷ E.g., Weingartner, *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue*, 4–5; Julia Annas, "Plato the Skeptic," in *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, eds. James Klagge and Nicholas Smith (*Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* [suppl] 1992), 60, n. 28.

⁷⁸ E.g., *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. ch. 1–4, is remarkably unresponsive to the criticisms and unaffected by the newer orientations discussed in these pages. There is plenty of doctrinal analysis, debate about chronological order, and disinterest in literary and dramatic aspects of the dialogues to be found in the pages of *Phronesis*, *Apeiron*, and other philosophy journals.

⁷⁹ T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). For Robinson's approach to the dialogue-form, see his, "Metodologia della lettura di Platone," *Quadermi dell'Istituto di Filosofia di Perugia* 4 (1987), 25–40.

⁸⁰ Terry Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) and *Plato's Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 8–15. I thank Charles M. Young for pointing this out.

⁸¹ Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, and Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*.

⁸² E.g., Brumbaugh, *Plato for the Modern Age*, 50; Joseph Cropsey, *Plato's World: Man's Place in the Cosmos* (Chicago: University of Chi-

cago Press, 1995) follows the sequence: *Prt*, *Tht*, *Euthyph*, *Sph*, *Plt*, *Ap*, *Cri*, *Phd*.

⁸³ Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Doctrine and Dramatic Dates in Plato's Later Dialogues," in *Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 91–102.

⁸⁴ E.g., Miller, *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman* and *Plato's Parmenides*; and Richard Patterson, "The Platonic Art of Comedy and Tragedy," *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982), 76–93, suggest a paideutic meaning that is also supported by Robb, *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece*, developing ideas of Havelock. Stefanini, *Platone*, is followed by Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato*, in the notion of a "constructive skepsis." The suggestion of Diogenes Laertius (3.63–65) that Plato may be attempting to mask his true beliefs from the multitude has been taken over, to some extent, by the Straussians and the Tübingen school.

⁸⁵ Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato*, and Gonzalez, *The Third Way*, esp. the Introduction, 1–13 and Walter Watson, "The Dogmatic Plato, the Skeptical Plato, and the Dialogic Plato," 189–210.

⁸⁶ A dramatic ordering of the corpus is suggested by Charles L. Griswold, "Irony in the Platonic Dialogues," in *The Sovereignty of Construction: Studies in the Thought of David Lachterman*, ed. D. W. Conway and P. Kerszberg (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996). Among those who take dramatic dates seriously but doubt that a complete dramatic ordering is possible are Diskin Clay, "Gaps in the 'Universe' of the Platonic Dialogues," *Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1987), 131–57 and Cropsey, *Plato's World*, ix.

⁸⁷ See Robert G. Hoerber, "Thrasyllos' Double Titles and the Platonic Canon," *Phronesis* 2 (1957), 10–26; J. A. Philip, "The Platonic Corpus," *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 296–308; and now Tarrant, *Thrasyllan Platonism*.

⁸⁸ Philip, "The Platonic Corpus," also sees revision and school influence.

⁸⁹ E.g., La, *Euthyphro*, *HpMa*. Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology*, 204: "no very sharp line can be drawn between wholly authentic and 'semi-authentic' Platonic texts."

⁹⁰ The only exception known to me is Holger Thesleff, *Studies in the Styles of Plato* (Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1967), which explicates five types of exposition and ten kinds of style and suggests how they both create structures and assist in communicating thought in the dialogues.

⁹¹ As Rowe correctly says, "The distinction between literature and philosophy is certainly not one that would have interested Plato" (*Plato. Phaedo*, ed. C. J. Rowe [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 3). See also Rossetti, "Where Philosophy and Literature Merge." An early appreciation of Plato as at once poet and philosopher was John Hartland-Swann, "Plato as Poet," *Philosophy* 26 (1951).

⁹² In general, see Albert Rivaud, "Platon auteur dramatique," *Revue d'Histoire de la Philosophie* 1 (1927), 125–51; Schaerer, *La question platonicienne*, Friedländer, *An Introduction*, vol. 1, ch. 8; Klein, Introduction to *A Commentary on Plato's Meno*; Henry Wolz, "Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to Plato's Dialogues," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 3 (1963), 236–70; Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato as Dramatist," *Journal of the Hellenic Studies* 75 (1955), 82–89; Gavin Ardley, "Plato as Tragedian," *Philosophical Studies* 12 (1967/68), 7–24; Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues*, ch. 1 and passim; Reynolds, *Interpreting Plato's Euthyphro and Meno*; and Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, 1–11.

⁹³ An exemplary study of character is Mary Whitlock Blundell, "Character and Meaning in Plato's *Hippias Minor*," in *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, ed. James Klagge and Nicholas Smith (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy [suppl] 1992), 131–72. Christopher Gill, *Plato's Use of Characters* (Ph.D. dissertation: Yale University, 1970) offers a typology. Warman Welliver, *Character, Plot and Thought in Plato's Timaeus-Critias* (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Henry Teloh, "The Importance of Interlocutors' Characters in Plato's Early Dialogues," *Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy* 2 (1986), 25–38; Rose Cherubin, "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger," in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Gerald A. Press (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 215–35. See also Friedländer, *The Dialogues, First Period and The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods*, vols. 2 and 3 passim; Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, passim; Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, passim. The traditional approach is that of Richard Patterson, "Plato on Philosophic Character," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 325–350, who argues for a Platonic doctrine of character rather than examining how Plato's characters may help to communicate meanings other than doctrinal.

⁹⁴ E.g., Richard Klonoski, "Setting and Characterization in Plato's *Euthyphro*," *Dialogos* 19 (1984), 123–40, and "The Portico of the Archon Basileus: The Significance of the Setting of Plato's *Euthyphro*," *Classical Journal* 81 (1986), 130–37. See also Friedländer, *The Dialogues, First Period and The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods*, vols. 2 and 3 passim.

⁹⁵ Charles Segal, "The Myth Was Saved: Reflections on Homer and the Mythology of Plato's *Republic*," *Hermes* 106 (1976), 196–208; Robert Eisner, "Socrates as Hero," *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982), 106–18; Bruce Gottfried, "Pan, the Cicadas, and Plato's Use of Myth in the *Phaedrus*," in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Gerald A. Press (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 179–95.

⁹⁶ E.g., Ronna Burger, *The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) sees the *Phaedo* as re-enacting the Theseus story. Thomas Payne, "The *Crito* as a Mythological Mime," *Interpretation* 11 (1983), 1–24, interprets the *Crito* as re-enacting the Embassy to Achilles. See also Richard Klonoski, "The Preservation of Homeric Tradition: Re-Performance in the *Republic* and *Odyssey*," *Clio* 22 (1993), 251–71; and Press, "Plato's Dialogues as Enactments."

⁹⁷ E.g., Dorothy Tarrant, "Plato's Use of Quotations and Other Illustrative Material," *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 1 (1951), 59–67; and Seth Benardete, "Some Misquotations of Homer," *Phronesis* 8 (1963), 173–78. Jules Labarbe, *L'Homere de Platon* (Liège: Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Liège, 1949) discusses about 250 quotations from Homer in the Platonic corpus, but from the standpoint of Homeric text transmission rather than Plato's use of those quotations for his own purposes.

⁹⁸ The general claim of Rory Egan, "Tragic Piety in Plato's *Euthyphro*," *Dionysius* 7 (1983), 17–32, that Plato borrows and adapts themes from tragedy, such as conflicting pieties, by way of setting his dialogues in educational competition with them is worth developing in conjunction with Richard Martin, *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the Iliad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). For many more allusions to the Homeric heroes, see Eisner, "Socrates as Hero," *Philosophy and Literature* 6 (1982), 106–18; and Diskin Clay,

"Socrates' Mulishness and Heroism," *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 52–60. See also Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, passim; Livio Rossetti, "Come cambia il filosofare quando il linguaggio allusivo entra in scena," in *Questioni di Etica e Metafisica* (Perugia, 1988), 29–41; and James A. Arieti, "Plato's Philosophical Antiope: The Gorgias," in *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, ed. Gerald A. Press (Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 197–214.

⁹⁹ Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*, and Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, are among the few general monographs on Plato to take jokes and humor into consideration in interpreting each dialogue.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., Griswold, "Irony in the Platonic Dialogues"; C. J. Rowe, "Platonic Irony," *Noua Tellus: Anuario del Centro de Estudios Clasicos* 5 (1987), 83–101; Reynolds, *Interpreting Plato's Euthyphro and Meno*, 14–20; and Victorino Tejera, "Plato's Ironies: Textural, Structural, and Allusional. On the Mathematical Number in *Republic* Books VIII and IX," *International Studies in Philosophy* 26 (1995), 85–99. Tejera, *Plato's Dialogues One by One*; and Arieti, *Interpreting Plato*, along with Friedländer, *The Dialogues*, vols. 2 and 3 are among the few general monographs on Plato to take the impact of irony into consideration in interpreting each dialogue.

¹⁰¹ So, e.g., Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* and "Looking for Clues."

¹⁰² E.g., E. de Strycker and S. R. Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study, with a Running Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1994). Jill Gordon, "Dialectic, Dialogue, and the Transformation of the Self," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29 (1996), uses reader response theory to argue that the dialogues can function to initiate a process of self-transformation.

¹⁰³ E.g., Julius Moravcsik, "Understanding and Knowledge in Plato's Philosophy," *Neue Hefte Philosophy* 15/16 (1979), 53–69, and Kenneth Dorter, "Levels of Knowledge in Plato's *Theaetetus*," *Review of Metaphysics* 44 (1990), 343–73, argue for understanding rather than propositional knowledge as Plato's goal. Gerald A. Press, "Knowledge as Vision in Plato's Dialogues," *Journal of Neoplatonic Studies* 3(1995), 61–89, develops ideas of Woodbridge, *The Son of Apollo*, and Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* and "Looking for Clues" about a 'vision' underlying the dialogues rather than a doctrine expounded in them. Similarly Sayre, "Why Plato Never Had a Theory of Forms," 177.

¹⁰⁴ E.g., Adi Ophir, "Plato's *Republic*: Philosophy as a Serious Game," *Iyyun* 35 (1986), 3–29; and Rosemary Desjardins, "Why Dialogues? Plato's Serious Play," in *Platonic Writings, Platonic Reading*, ed. Charles L. Griswold (New York: Routledge, 1988), 110–125. See Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 4.56–65 for the evidence about PAIDIA and apt quotations (1) in summary, *Epinomis* 992b, and (2) the equivalent epigraphic quotation of Bronowski: "You must see that in a sense all science, all human thought, is a form of play" (56).

¹⁰⁵ de Strycker and Slings, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*.

¹⁰⁶ Contrast with Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and C. D. C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato's Apology of Socrates* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).

¹⁰⁷ Rutherford, *The Art of Plato*.

¹⁰⁸ Among the most important large-scale recent works are, Tigerstedt, *Neoplatonic Interpretation* and *Interpreting Plato*; Frantisek

Novotny, *The Posthumous Life of Plato*, trans. J. Fabryova (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977); James Hankins, "Plato in the Middle Ages," and *Plato in the Italian Renaissance* 2 vol. (Leiden: Brill, 1990); Heinrich Dörrie, *Der Platonismus in der Antike* 3 vols. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987); and Mansfeld, *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy and Heresiography in Context*.

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