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permeates at least most dialogues" (14–15). Since Corlett acknowledges that both the Mouthpiece and Anti-Mouthpiece Interpretations have dramatic and Socratic versions, it is disappointing that he does not devote much attention to the work of Mouthpiece scholars who emphasize the Socratic Interpretation. Such scholars would agree that no character is ever speaking for Plato as a mouthpiece and that phrases such as 'Plato says . . . ' should be abandoned in favor of phrases such as 'Plato's Socrates says . . . '. However, Socratic-Mouthpiece interpreters would deny Corlett's claim that not one theory or belief is evident in the dialogues and reasonably attributable to their author.

Corlett contends that the attribution of the Socratic method to Plato by Anti-Mouthpiece interpreters like himself differs from the Mouthpiece interpreters' attribution to Plato of messages such as: (1) the unexamined life is not worth living; (2) a good person cannot be harmed; and (3) knowledge includes knowing that one knows nothing. Corlett writes that, "at worst, the Socratic Interpretation is 'dogmatic' in a minimal way, ascribing to Plato the beliefs entailed by a standard construal of the Socratic Method but nothing more" (59). But here the *amount* of dogma seems irrelevant, given that Corlett contends repeatedly that "there is no way of knowing whether Plato himself subscribes to a particular view" (58). So, despite Corlett's denial that the Anti-Mouthpiece Interpretation in effect turns the interpretation of Plato's dialogues into a subjective project, he has subjectively admitted the Socratic method into the purportedly empty set of notions attributable to Plato.

Plato's choice to write dialogues rather than treatises does indicate that he wanted to express himself differently than his philosophical predecessors. It is probable that he preferred to be an author who, in the spirit of Socrates, prompted his readers to search for truth on their own by having his characters model philosophical activity. Nevertheless, his choice to be an author also indicates his desire to use words publicly. Can we not say that poets and tragedians express themselves (albeit indirectly) through each *entire* work produced? While scholars should heed Corlett's caution about assuming that the lead character, Socrates or a Stranger, functions as a mouthpiece for Plato, Corlett should be more sensitive to the fact that a dialogue *as a whole* does, to some extent, reveal something about its author.

Even if one maintains, *pace* Corlett, that doctrines can be harvested from Plato's dialogues, Corlett's criticisms should make such interpreters work harder at explaining their assumptions, enabling them to offer more compelling accounts of prominent Platonic "theories," such as the theory of Forms.

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Michail Maiatsky. *Platon: Penseur du visuel*. Commentaires philosophiques. Paris: l'Harmattan, 2005. Pp. 299. €25.50.

Recent philosophers and cultural critics (e.g., Foucault and Rorty) have written a new chapter in the long history of anti-Platonism, making Plato the evil genius of a visual prejudice allegedly infecting the heart of Western metaphysics. Some find it contradictory that Plato expresses anti-visual thoughts but seems nevertheless deeply pro-visual; thus, his frequent use of visual language confuses his project. Others (the present reviewer included) have argued that a vision rather than a set of propositions constitutes Plato's philosophy. Although it is widely recognized that vision is an important idea in Plato's thought, little has been done to clarify the full extent and function of visual language and ideas (for which Maiatsky uses the unfamiliar term 'visuality'). Maiatsky fills this lacuna, proceeding on a basis that is explicitly historical and contextual. He argues that, while being the first to systematically thematize visuality in Western philosophy, Plato is simultaneously its "first prosecutor, defender, and judge" (16).

After a useful overview of Platonic scholarship on vision, visual language, and metaphors (16–46), the book is divided into three parts of three chapters each. "The Citizen's Look" deals with the rarely discussed political aspects of vision in Plato. Maiatsky shows here how

vision provides a social bond for the city, how the play of many kinds of looks is frequent and constitutive in the city as in the dialogues, and that a complex political visuality informs the dialogues. "Seeing and Knowing" is epistemological, analyzing familiar distinctions between physical and mental vision, appearance and knowledge, and the theory of Ideas for their specifically visual meaning. "Being Seen and Being" emphasizes metaphysical and cosmological aspects of Platonic visuality.

Extended discussions of several dialogues reveal important aspects and functions of visuality. *Laches* (ch. 2) is "a veritable introduction to Platonic political and moral optics" (63). *Phaedo* (ch. 4) focuses on the soul's two kinds of vision and *Phaedrus* exhibits the soul's visual life and "visual dietetics." *Theaetetus* (ch. 6) deals with the soul's eye, vision and perception, and seeing in relation to knowing. *Timaeus* (ch. 7) emphasizes the cosmic significance of the demiurge's invisible paradigm, creation through imitation of the invisible, and the visible as an incentive to the invisible. The just city of the *Republic* (ch. 8) makes visible the invisible and, of course, centers on the grand—and visual—metaphors of the Sun, Line, and Cave.

Although there is an antinomy in Plato's visual terms and concepts, Maiatsky sees it as an inducement to synthesis rather than as an exclusive alternation. The distinction and opposition between vision and thought existed in Greek language and thought prior to Plato, with seeing already used metaphorically for knowing. Plato's innovations are to express the opposition in terms of a distinction between two types of vision, rather than between vision and something else, and to claim that the two types, though opposed, are also related to each other. Vision is ambivalent or ambiguous, since it is both an obstacle and a stimulus to true knowledge; certain things we see "make us think." The same thing goes for the invisibility of virtue that does not exclude permanent observability of its visible manifestations; and Maiatsky correctly sees that the distinction between appearance and reality is moral and political before it is epistemological and metaphysical.

Besides bringing together the many different types and levels of Plato's use of visual terms and concepts, Maiatsky recognizes that Plato's dialogues are addressed to readers at different levels, appreciates Plato's use of plausible arguments and verisimilitude, of myths and irony. He argues that the apparent antinomies in Platonic thought about vision, in fact, constitute its positive contributions to Western thinking. So, rather than visual language hindering his project, it has assisted in its accomplishment. Plato takes the existing mix of usages, introduces distinctions, and transforms a confused usage into something properly metaphoric, i.e., conscious of semantic transpositions introduced. Plato's achievement was to separate the domains of the proper and the metaphorical in the visual. His view reverses that of ordinary people and suggests an inversion of the pre-existing metaphoric relation itself. Pre-corporeal ("anamnesiac") vision turns out to be vision properly speaking—something deeply ironic and strange.

Maiatsky's book will be uncongenial to those who are only interested in the dialogues' arguments and logic, as well as those unfamiliar with scholarly developments in other languages and countries. The volume has the faults incident to its origin as a doctoral dissertation (Fribourg, 2004) and is probably more focused on French scholarship than is strictly necessary. Nevertheless, *Platon: Penseur du visuel* poses an important challenge to recent Continental anti-Platonism and a welcome contribution to the new Platonism that seeks to understand the dialogues holistically, contextually, and with sensitivity to literary and dramatic nuance, rather than finding in Plato either a dogmatist or a skeptic.

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Ricardo Salles. *The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism*. Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005. Pp. xxii + 132. Cloth, \$79.95.

Stoic determinism has been the object of important work recently, most notably Susanne Bobzien's monumental work, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*. Ricardo Salles