

many more than two *hodoi* envisaged in the poem as a whole (36ff.), such as the journey from Darkness to Light undertaken by the Youth himself, and the wanderings of the *akrita phyla* in Fr. 6. Indeed, Jean Frère is already on record as distinguishing four. But C. himself goes rather overboard on this, ultimately distinguishing no less than *ten*, and rejoicing in this as a good Pythagorean number. On the other hand, his analysis of the meaning of myth in a Parmenidean context, drawing on the insights of such thinkers as Vernant and Détienne, is most useful. All too often no clear distinction is made between mythical and allegorical discourse, and which of these Parmenides is employing. In fact, though his connections with epic, and with Hesiod in particular, are universally recognized (being explored very fully by Mourelatos, for one), the way in which Parmenides transposes the *genealogic* tradition of the epic into his myth as of the "way" has not been investigated, I think, with such acuteness as C. employs here.

The body of the book is a detailed, more or less line-by-line exegesis of the surviving fragments, from which much may be learned, if only by forcing one to challenge one's assumptions, without necessarily changing them. C. himself sees his distinctive contribution to the understanding of the poem as moving the center of attention from Being to the concept of the "multiple paths" by which knowledge is conducted to its goal. Even the way of seeming is thus designed to bring us, by means of a properly structured cosmogony, to a knowledge of "the Same," or the oneness of Being. His argument certainly serves to make plausible sense of the second half of the poem and to refine our view of Parmenides' relation to genealogical myth, and as such it is worthy of consideration by all students of Parmenides.

Particular topics on which he seems to me to be right or useful are: the analysis of the meaning and subject of *esti* in Fr. 2 (175ff.); the nature of the *eonta* of Fr. 7, 1 (200ff.); on Parmenides not having a true concept of eternity (226ff.); "the Same" as the subject of Fr. 3 and 8, 34 (238 ff.); the discussion of metaphor, myth, and allegory at 252ff. (also well discussed before him by Mourelatos, however, in chap. 1 of *The Way of Parmenides*); the analysis of *dokein* and cognates (252ff.); the rendering of *gnômas* at 8, 53 as "signifying marks" (i.e., "they proposed two forms for naming significant marks"); and the decision to move Fr. 4 to the second half of the poem, between Fr. 8 and 19 (334ff.).

No contribution to Parmenidean studies these days can, I suppose, hope to constitute the last word, or even to command very wide assent, but C.'s work deserves welcome, I think, for its many stimulating insights and suggestions.

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V. Tejera. *Plato's Dialogues One by One. A Structural Interpretation*. New York: Irvington Publishers, 1984. Pp. x + 424. \$47.50.

The study and interpretation of Plato, an enterprise which has been going on at least since the generation of Speusippus, makes three characteristic and related mistakes. First, its overall aim has been to discover, whether for veneration or for refutation,

what Plato's doctrines are, and thus what his philosophy is; for it has been assumed that his philosophy can only be the doctrines he maintained. Second, in order to accomplish this primary task, the interpretive tradition has had to ignore what it otherwise recognizes, that Plato's writings are dialogues, dramatic writings of consummate artistry, not the merely formal philosophic dialogues of an Augustine or Berkeley. Third, it has ignored the historical context in which these philosophic dramas were produced. There have been exceptions, of course, such as Brumbaugh, Friedlaender, Klein, Randall, Rosen, Shorey, and Woodbridge, who have taken drama seriously. Even of these, some have used dramatic analysis as a way of getting at Plato's doctrines and most have failed to set the dialogues in their political and intellectual contexts. But no one, to my knowledge, has previously attempted an interpretation of the whole corpus that reveals, at once, their non-doctrinal yet philosophic character, their dramatic subtlety, and their cultural allusiveness. Professor Tejera's book undertakes all of this, and it ought to have a significant impact on Plato studies.

As the title suggests, *Plato's Dialogues One by One* does not present an overall argument or interpretation of Plato; it proposes a new way to read Plato's writings. The book is divided into four parts. Chapter 1, "To the Reader," lays down the author's aims, methods, and principles: he wants to enable readers to 'respond' to the dialogues on their own terms. This means that we must not impose on them a system of doctrine nor make assumptions about the chronology of their composition. Instead, he premisses that each dialogue has its own "well-constituted" integrity and design, that conversations have "tones," (sometimes serious, sometimes playful, ironic, witty, etc.), that characters have "personal interactions," and that all of this requires attention to historical context. Instead of presenting more or less concealed doctrines, the dialogues emerge as "exhibitive reflections" of the human condition that "have literary closure but are intellectually open-ended" (6f.), and Plato turns out to be a philosopher like Socrates, critical and synoptic rather than assertive and doctrinal.

The rest of Part 1 seems intended to sensitize us to rhetorical or literary features, e.g., the dialogical nature of the dialogues, principles of dialogical reading, characteristics of characters (such as Socrates' dominance and wit), humor, and irony. This is accomplished within Tejera's readings of *Apology*, *Phaedo*, *Meno*, *Phaedrus*, and *Gorgias*. Part 2, by contrast, seems to emphasize structural (architectural or architectonic) aspects: the structure of "Dialogue and Dialectic" in chap. 7, on the *Protagoras* and *Parmenides*, of the "counter-utopia" (111) of the *Republic* (chap. 8), of the cosmos (*Timaeus*, chap. 9). In chap. 10, reflection on form and design in the dialogues leads him to reject the *Laws* as a genuine Platonic work.

The focus of Part 3 seems to be epistemology, in a sense less technical than is customary today: "Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Knowledge" (chap. 11, *Charmides*), the origin of epistemology as a distinct endeavor (chap. 12, *Theaetetus*), and the sophistic knowledge of the Eleatic Stranger in *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Part 4 is more difficult to type, but, again in a broader than contemporary sense, the concerns could all be seen as 'value questions': education in *Euthydemus* and *Euthyphro* (chap. 15), name-giving (chap. 16, *Kratylus*), beauty (chap. 17, *Hippias Major*), "Problems of Morality, Inspiration, and Practice" (chap. 18, *Hippias Minor* and *Ion*), "The Intellectual Plea-

tures and the Unity of the Moral Excellences" (chap. 19, *Philebos* and *Laches*), and, finally, love (chap. 20, *Symposium*).

Tejera's readings display a remarkable sensitivity to linguistic, dramatic, historic, and philosophic nuance and the book offers many unfamiliar and even revolutionary interpretations. His rejection of the *Laws* has already been mentioned; I have alluded to his view that the *Republic* is a satire, a counter-utopia, and "an implicit attack on Spartanism, militarism, and Pythagorean conservatism" (97) and that the Eleatic Stranger is actually "a most daring Sophist" (210), who is trying to make himself the Philosopher and Socrates the Sophist.

Other chapters are equally subversive of the familiar, accepted interpretations of Plato's doctrines: the *Protagoras* is a *dissos logos* to end all *dissoi logoi* (87); the *Charmides* is, in part, a "discussion . . . of the definition or possibility of pure philosophy" (162); the *Theaetetus* is "a warning against the tendency of philosophy to become pure philosophy" (180); the *Euthyphro* and *Hippias Major* both reveal a Plato who knew all about the 'theory of ideas', but was criticizing it (271) in the same way that the *Laches* shows us "about the limits of overintellectualism" (338); and that "Socrates is in fact having fun with the doctrine of ideas and the hypothesis of participation" (23).

Not every one will be persuaded by Tejera's readings, of course, and the book may be criticized on several other grounds as well. Its overall organization is not clear; I have guessed at the unifying themes for the various parts, but I should not have had to. There are sections that will be understandable only to those thoroughly familiar with the dialogue under discussion. The book has a puzzling and unexplained footnoting system. More seriously, in a book that explicitly undertakes to restore the intellectual and political allusiveness of the dialogues, I think that readers deserve to read at least some of the evidence that permits Tejera to assign, for example, such importance to the Oaths of Amnesty in understanding the *Apology* or to the Pythagorizing and Academicizing intellectual atmosphere of Plato's Athens throughout. Readers cannot adequately assess the truth or the relevance of such important background considerations on the basis solely of the author's assertion and unspecified references to secondary source books found only in a bibliography.

But, in sum, Tejera's book is absolutely essential reading for historians of philosophy and specialists in ancient philosophy. Even if some of his interpretations turn out not to withstand criticism, *Plato's Dialogues One by One* is full of ideas that should be taken seriously by Plato scholars. And I hope that we will soon see more from him substantiating the kinds of background claims he makes here, clarifying the dramatic ordering of the dialogues to which he alludes, and discussing more directly the principles and methods of the 'dialogical readings' he so fruitfully opposes to the doctrinal, non-dramatic, and ahistorical Plato who has too long bedevilled students and lovers of the dialogues.

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