

(48–49). Thus, we are left to wonder what to make of the dogmatists' supposed belief that philosophical reason can provide them with this knowledge. Were Socrates and the Pyrrhonists intellectually outmatched by these other philosophers? Or were these others insufficiently self-critical?

Unfortunately, Cooper does not discuss these questions, and given his interpretation of ancient philosophy, it is difficult to see how to answer them without charging the dogmatists with the gravest of philosophical sins: a lack of self-knowledge. Consequently, one is left to wonder whether Hadot was not on to something after all. Perhaps it is neither the case that Socrates and the Pyrrhonists were philosophical slouches nor that the dogmatic schools were insufficiently self-critical. Maybe the latter understood their commitments to their particular ways of life to rest on foundations that were not purely cognitive.

This is not to say that Cooper is wrong to be critical of Hadot's exposition of ancient philosophy. There are indeed lacunae in Hadot's account, particularly surrounding the notion of existential choice, and Cooper's emphasis on the role of reason in the ancients' philosophical practice seems to push the discussion in the right general direction. In any event, Cooper's attempt to write a book for a wide readership is successful. Readers interested in the subject of ancient philosophy as a way of life will find the book provocative, and those who seek a sophisticated introduction to ancient moral theory will learn a great deal from it.

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Thomas M. Tuozzo. *Plato's Charmides: Positive Elenchus in a "Socratic" Dialogue*. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. xii + 359. Cloth, \$90.00.

Unlike many other dialogues, Plato's *Charmides* has never elicited much sustained scholarly attention, even though it focuses on an important moral excellence, *sôphrosunê* (temperance, moderation), features two of Plato's relatives who were members of the oligarchic government of 304–303 BC, and includes two refutations of the *Republic's* formula, "doing one's own things," as well as a long, complex discussion of "knowledge of knowledge." The present work is therefore a welcome addition to the small collection of English books on it (Tuckey, *Plato's Charmides*; Hyland, *The Virtue of Philosophy*; Schmid, *Plato's Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality*).

Early chapters, comprising nearly half the book's length, introduce the author's motivating concern: to grasp the relationship between "the literary and the argumentative dimensions" (3), the dialogue's historical and cultural context (ch. 2), the opening scene (ch. 3), and the psychagogic and paideutic functions of dialectic (ch. 4). Especially noteworthy are his critique of the retrojective assumptions of modern scholars about what "philosophy" was taken to be in antiquity (6–14), his extensive re-evaluation of the historical Critias and Charmides (53–89), and the detailed rational reconstruction of Zalmoxian medicine (110–30). The discussion of *sôphrosunê* (90–98), incorporating previous work by North (*Sophrosyne*) and Rademaker (*Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint*), is the best short summary available in English.

As the subtitle suggests, the core argument of the book opposes the once-widespread belief that Socratic elenchus is only negative or critical, whether one believes this is a problem or not. Thus, chapters 5–10 take the reader very carefully through the dialogue's "argument"—which the author considers "a single progressive investigation of" *sôphrosunê* (155)—arguing at each stage for the positive content or possibilities of what appear to be purely negative refutations. Since dialectic is psychagogic on the author's view, refutations lead interlocutors, as dialogues lead readers, to deeper understandings of the subject that are specified step by step. The argument culminates in the overall claim that the view to which the interlocutors and we are led in the *Charmides* is that *sôphrosunê* is knowledge of the good. Chapter 11 then argues more generally that this knowledge is essentially elenctic

and that the good is the unconditional good by virtue of (or through relation to) which all (other) conditional goods are beneficial.

In many ways, this is a model of what monographs about Plato's dialogues should be and do. Rather than looking at selected bits and pieces, the author interprets the dialogue as an organic whole to which the contribution of every element may be understood, and in its well-defined historical and cultural context. He maintains a distinction, often lost, between what Socrates says and does *in* the dialogue and what Plato does by having him say and do that. His engagement with the secondary literature beyond English is admirable, as are the depth and detail of his analyses of the perplexing arguments of 165c–175a (189–286), but it is disappointing that he does not engage more directly with Schmid's very different view of what Critias and Charmides represent and of what "Socratic rationality" is. His attempted rehabilitation of Critias should motivate a broader, more careful, and deeper reassessment of characters in the dialogues. It is certainly reasonable to attribute serious ideas to Critias, and to suppose that Plato is responding to them among other things, but the author's attempts to whitewash the oligarchic misdeeds of 304–303 BC (59–99) are unlikely to persuade many.

Similarly, as a critique of the Vlastosian orthodoxy in the English-speaking world, this is an excellent book. But readers who have not been in thrall to Vlastos, or have not thought there was a Socratic philosophy to be found in Plato's dialogues as distinct from Plato's own philosophy, may be troubled that the author's *Charmides* also argues for the idea that *sôphrosunê* is knowledge of the Good. More dogmatic readers will welcome his defense of this idea, but they may not share his denial that all dialectic is negative; they may worry, too, about seeing Plato's political views more aligned with the aristocratic conservatives, or seeing Plato as "continuing and deepening" (57) the oligarchic, pro-Spartan views of Critias.

The author's very useful critique of Vlastosian beliefs, however, remains within the paradigm of "Socratic philosophy"—that is, arguments are referred to as "Socratic" rather than "Platonic"—and fails to engage with other scholarly literatures, including the many others who consider the dialogue "educative" (e.g. Sayre) or who propose alternative ways of understanding the relation between the logical and the literary-dramatic aspects of the dialogues.

Despite these concerns, this is the best book on the *Charmides* in a long while. It challenges much in the Socratic philosophy camp and should engage the attention of all Plato scholars. The book is nicely produced, but contains a surprising number of errata including misspelled author names and inconsistent capitalization of 'the good.'

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Boethius. *On Aristotle, On Interpretation*, 1–3. Translated by Andrew Smith. Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. London: Duckworth, 2010. Pp. viii + 166. Cloth, \$130.00.

Boethius. *On Aristotle, On Interpretation*, 4–6. Translated by Andrew Smith. Ancient Commentators on Aristotle. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2011. Pp. viii + 149. Cloth, \$130.00.

Boethius, "the first of the scholastics," had an influence on the Latin Middle Ages that is difficult to overestimate. His translations of and commentaries on Aristotle's philosophical and logical works were the main conduit between the Greek classical culture and the early Middle Ages. His two commentaries on Aristotle's *Peri Hermenias* ("On Interpretation"), the longer of which is translated in the present two volumes (the first covering Books 1–3 and the second Books 4–6), were particularly influential.

Unfortunately, those seeking to understand this aspect of Boethius will find little to encourage them here. Aquinas is mentioned once (on the book jacket), and Augustine only a few times. About other great writers of the Middle Ages this work is silent.