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In short, there are difficulties aplenty in this book. But *The Fragility of Goodness* is excellent and worthy of careful scrutiny. Even those of us who disagree with many of its central claims will benefit from confronting it.

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C. J. De Vogel. *Rethinking Plato and Platonism*. Mnemosyne. Bibliotheca Classica Batava. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986. Pp. + 253. Paper, Guilders 85.

On April 7, 1986, after more than fifty-five years of active participation in scholarly discussions of Plato and Platonism, Plotinus and Neoplatonism, ancient Greek philosophy and Christianity both ancient and modern, Cornelia J. de Vogel died while she was correcting the proofs of *Rethinking Plato and Platonism*. For this reason and because of its contents the volume seems to be the recapitulation and summation of that long and productive career. The essays collected here, for the most part already published between 1978 and 1983, revolve around the question, "Who was Plato, the philosopher?" (viii), and taken collectively they tell from Mme. de Vogel's point of view the story of Plato studies in the twentieth century, a story in which she herself is a character. The story turns on one central issue, that of the "unwritten doctrines," and therefore around the "Tübingen-Heidelberg Plato" (viii) in general and H. J. Krämer in particular. For de Vogel, as for these German scholars, the question is not whether such doctrines existed, about which she has no doubts, but what exactly they were. Once comprehended, these will serve at once to characterize "Plato, the philosopher," to define Platonism, to enable us to see where and how Plotinus or other Neoplatonists diverged from or misunderstood true Platonism, and, finally, to decide whether there really is, as some have contended, a conflict between Platonism and Christianity.

Part one, "Critical Reflections," consists mostly of long, detailed, and closely argued reviews of the principal books published and positions taken on these interwoven issues in our century. The first chapter reviews the literature from 1930 to 1980, including prominently Burnet, Taylor, Natorp, Ross, Gomperz, Krämer, Gaiser, de Vries, and Solmsen. Chapter two is devoted to Findlay's *Plato. The Written and Unwritten Doctrines*, chapter three to Guthrie's two volumes in the Cambridge History of Greek Philosophy, and chapter four to some "Italian Reactions to Krämer's Plato." In dealing with each of these authors Mme. de Vogel finds much to agree with as well as much to disagree with; no one is simply "right" or "wrong." In general, though, she thinks that Krämer and those who follow him correctly argue for the existence of unwritten doctrines, but that they have misunderstood, or have understood too rigidly, their content. Chapter five addresses two problems for Platonists and Neoplatonists today, and argues, as against the eminent English Neoplatonist and translator of Plotinus, A. H. Armstrong, that there is no conflict between Neoplatonism and Christianity, for the 'cosmic dualism' on which Armstrong bases his view is to be found in neither Plato nor Plotinus, properly understood.

The three previously published essays of Part two reiterate and make explicit what

Mme. de Vogel takes to be "The Doctrines"—that is to say, the "unwritten doctrines"—that are Plato's and that constitute Platonism: the metaphysical principles of the One (or First or Good) and the Dyad (or Being), the third hypostasis, *nous*, the account of human nature that follows from this, and its implications for the human moral situation. The volume concludes with an "Analytical Contents" which gives some guidance to the arguments of the individual essays, but there is neither the Index nor the Bibliography of works cited that would make this volume more useful to those who are not immersed in these discussions already.

One might complain about the (perhaps) excessive positivity of some of Mme. de Vogel's judgments; especially on the crucial issue of whether, as against Cherniss and certain others, there *were* any unwritten doctrines. She notes his contrary opinion, but virtually ignores the arguments in support of it. And that is the general tenor of the various essays; her 'rethinking' leads her to revise or retract none of her previous judgments. Yet her positions, even when one wants to disagree with them, are based on a deep and thorough knowledge of the texts and bespeak an intelligence that is at once clear, exact, genteel, and sympathetic. Our discussions of these issues will be the poorer for her absence.

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Aristotle. *Metaphysics. Books 7–10. Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota.* Translated by Montgomery Furth. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1985. Pp. xii + 154. Paper, \$7.50.

Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is a translator's nightmare. The crabbed and compressed Greek text defies accurate rendering into graceful English. A smooth and unambiguous translation will surely fail to be neutral on points of interpretation. In pursuit of neutrality one must be relentlessly literal, and that is the option Furth has chosen in this new translation of four of the central books of the *Metaphysics*. The result, as Furth notes, is not pretty. Indeed, an ancestor of the present volume, in underground circulation a decade ago, came to be called *The Eek Papers*, since it was written in "a vernacular neither English nor Greek" (vi).

One hopes that philosophically serious but Greekless readers will not be frightened off, for this translation will bring them closer to Aristotle's original than any yet produced. It will not replace the great Ross translation (of course it is not intended to), but can justly take its place alongside it; the reader of one will surely want to consult the other.

In addition to the translation, Furth has provided a glossary of key terms (both Greek-to-Eek and Eek-to-Greek), an analytical table of contents, and a rather sparse (38 pages) set of notes. Flags are set in the text to signal the first occurrence of terms included in the glossary and to mark passages discussed in the notes.

A literal translation aims to present just what the author said without prejudicing the issue of what he meant, where that is subject to varying interpretations. In the case of a philosophical text, where disputes over interpretation are common even when translation is not an issue, literalness is crucial. But it is important to realize that literalness is an