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sions that are substituted for, and “symmetrically inferentially significant.” Predicates, by contrast, are substitution frames and “asymmetrically inferentially significant.” Besides inference and substitution the third crucial semantic notion is anaphora which enables us to explain how such unrepeatable linguistic elements as demonstratives function as type-repeatables in substitution inferences.

Brandom believes that in the end his theory allows him to save a strong sense of objectivity (that is, to justify the distinction between what is really correct and what is merely taken to be so), as well as to overcome some dichotomies which have pervaded modern philosophy, especially the dichotomy between the conceptual and non-conceptual, and between facts and norms. I am doubtful whether he has succeeded in the latter case, since I found such claims as “far from opposing one another, the realms of fact and norm mutually include one another: fact-stating talk is explained in normative terms, and normative facts emerge as one kind of fact among others” scarcely illuminating (p. 625–6). It seems to me that this issue, along with a cluster of problems in the philosophy of mind which Brandom merely mentions in passing (e.g. the difference between ‘sentience’ and ‘sapience’) requires a more thorough treatment in order to make his theory tenable. But, of course, it would be absurd to insist that all these problems should receive more attention in a book whose length already tried the patience of the reader.—Tadeusz Szubka, *University of Notre Dame*.

BRICKHOUSE, Thomas C. and SMITH, Nicholas D. *Plato's Socrates*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. xiv + 240 pp. \$35.00—For fifteen years, the authors have been working together on what they call, following the convention established by Gregory Vlastos and his associates, “Socratic philosophy.” The project of Socratic philosophy is to reconstruct and assess the philosophic beliefs, doctrines, and arguments of Socrates from rigorous examination of Plato's early dialogues. Whereas Vlastos and others have believed that the philosophy so extracted is that of the historical Socrates, Brickhouse and Smith “are agnostic about whose philosophy (if anyone's) is accurately represented in Plato's early dialogues” (p. viii); and their more particular contribution to the discussion has been to argue, again in contrast to others who work on Socratic philosophy, that a consistent philosophy can be derived from the plain sense of the words, without either convicting Socrates of logical blunders or having recourse to irony, humor, or any other literary or dramatic mode of explanation. Thus they are rebels in the Socratic philosophy society. This is their second jointly authored monograph, and, like *Socrates on Trial* (Princeton, 1989), it builds on a number of jointly authored articles.

This new volume continues in the iconoclastic vein, arguing for controversial positions that, taken together, give perhaps the most comprehensive and integrated account produced by the Socratic philosophy movement thus far, covering Socratic logic, epistemology, psychology,

ethics, politics, and religion. Chapter 1 looks at Socrates' elenctic method, his way of doing philosophy, and argues that he does not actually have a specific method, but that his cross-examinations nevertheless provide a constructive way to do philosophy. In chapter 2, Brickhouse and Smith maintain that Socratic ignorance is only of that which makes its possessor wise and that Socrates is nowhere necessarily guilty of the "Socratic fallacy." Chapter 3 moves from analysis of Socrates' peculiar attributions of psychological states to persons who are unaware of having them to a full-scale psychological theory that is consistent with—indeed, explicates—the Delphic command, "Know Thyself," and explains Socrates' denial of *akrasia*. Chapter 4, "Socratic Ethics," accepts the mainstream view that Socrates is an ethical eudaimonist but goes on to argue the controversial thesis that, although Socrates considers virtue extremely important, he does not consider it either necessary or sufficient for eudaimonia. Chapter 5 claims that in politics Socrates was a legal authoritarian, but that he was not in principle anti-democratic or in favor of any particular constitutional form, and, in consequence, that there were no partisan political reasons for his trial and execution. This view connects with the final chapter, dealing with "Socratic Religion," where Brickhouse and Smith claim, contrary to what most scholars now believe, that the trial really was religiously motivated, that Socrates represents the charges accurately, and does not evade them.

Throughout, the volume is well-organized, clearly written, and carefully, sometimes ingeniously, argued. The problems, if they *are* problems, are matters of principle and method. The entire enterprise of Socratic philosophy is predicated on having a set of "early dialogues" to examine; but increasing criticism of Platonic chronology suggests that we cannot actually identify such a set, and in fact there has never been agreement about exactly what the set comprises. The authors' "insisting always on interpretations of [the texts] which provide as obvious a sense to them as can be given, as well as a consistent picture of the . . . views motivating them" (p. vii) may seem uncontroversial, but it begs important and prior questions: about whether what is "obvious" to contemporary analytically trained philosophers would have been so to fourth-century Greeks, about whether Plato who, after all, is the author of the dialogues being interpreted here, wanted his audience to take home the "obvious sense" of the words; and about whether he intended or attempted to make all of Socrates' various statements in different dialogues consistent with each other. In light of this, the authors' explicit refusal to answer the question of whose philosophy this is leaves open the possibility that what they have given us is a perfectly consistent and fascinating philosophical edifice, a set of doctrines and arguments derived from an arbitrary selection of Platonic dialogues read as if they were treatises and attributable to no one in particular. In other words, the Socratic philosophy so thoroughly and ingeniously constructed here may be not the philosophy of the historical Socrates, nor that of a Platonic character, and certainly not the philosophy of Plato himself; but rather a coherent, consistent, and contemporary philosophy that is Socratic in the sense that it makes use

of some statements made by Socrates in some of Plato's dialogues. It's not Socrates and it's not Plato, but it's not bad, either.—Gerald A. Press, *Hunter College, C.U.N.Y.*

BRUNSCHWIG, Jacques. *Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy*. Translated by Janet Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. xiii + 277. \$69.95—This scintillating collection gathers twelve important papers by Jacques Brunschwig. Dating from 1977 to 1990, all but one have appeared only in French and two are previously unpublished. No justification is required for making these exciting, influential papers available to a wider audience. In each paper Brunschwig focuses on a key problem, a puzzle, or a text that is recalcitrant to interpretation, employing marvelous erudition in classical philology, encyclopedic knowledge of Hellenistic philosophy, and subtle familiarity with contemporary philosophy.

The two oldest papers address controversial Epicurean texts. In one Brunschwig argues convincingly that Epicurus does not, as some scholars have claimed, maintain that humans in the initial stages of culture used private languages. In the other he tries to make sense of the puzzling Epicurean claim that “the all” is immutable. Brunschwig adroitly pinpoints problems with current orthodoxy, on which “into” in the proposition “there is nothing *into* which the all can change” is construed metaphorically insofar as the terminus of the change is a state. He proposes the literal version “there is nothing where the all might betake itself.”

Six papers on Stoicism comprise the heart of the book (ca. 150 pages). Two examine Stoic accounts of “simple” and “non-simple” propositions. Another shows how the Stoic distinction between proper and common nouns enabled them to propose solutions to disputes over identity. Three brilliant papers concern Stoic metaphysics. In “On a Stoic way of not being” Brunschwig adds a Stoic chapter to what he engagingly terms the “history of relations between desire and not being.” He skillfully dispels worries about the oddity of the (materialist) Stoics’ view that we chase after linguistic items that have a shadowy existence. The Stoics held that the intentional objects of impulses (*horme*), as predicates (a species of *lekta* [“sayables”]), are incorporeals and not beings, but these predicates correspond to substantial entities (for example, happiness). Next comes a fascinating discussion of whether the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (ca. 230–140 B.C.) can be credited with a definite anticipation of the ontological argument as several scholars have plausibly suggested. Brunschwig insists that Diogenes is not committed to the *a priori* association of what naturally exists with the concept of god, for his argument aims rather at showing that it is rational for human beings to worship the gods.

In the masterly sixty-five-page “The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic Ontology,” Brunschwig provides an elaborate account of how and why the Stoics came to elevate the notion of